A Trademark Justification for Design Patent Rights by Crouch, Dennis D.
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
2013
A Trademark Justification for Design Patent Rights
Dennis D. Crouch
University of Missouri School of Law, crouchdd@missouri.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Dennis D. Crouch, A Trademark Justification for Design Patent Rights, Harv. J. L. & Tech, (forthcoming 2013).




Legal Studies Research Paper Series 
Research Paper No. 2010-17 
 
 
A TRADEMARK JUSTIFICATION 
FOR DESIGN PATENT RIGHTS 
 
Dennis D. Crouch 
 
24 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW &TECHNOLOGY 
(FORTHCOMING) 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Sciences 
Research Network Electronic Paper Collection at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656590    
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656590
 
 
A TRADEMARK JUSTIFICATION FOR DESIGN PATENT RIGHTS 
DENNIS D. CROUCH* 
Forthcoming, 24 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY ___ (2010) 
 
I. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
II. Current Law and Practice of Design Patent Protection ............................................................ 9 
A. Design Patents and Their Low Standard of Patentability: Doctrine ................................ 12 
B. Design Patents and Their Low Standard of Patentability: Empirical Results ................. 16 
C. Design Patents and the Overlap of Trade Dress Rights ..................................................... 23 
III. Justifying A Policy of Design Patent Rights ............................................................................ 25 
A. Trademark Function of Design Patent Protection .............................................................. 25 
B. Doctrinal Bootstrapping Role of Design Patents ................................................................ 38 
C. Design Patents As a Bulwark against Trademark Doctrinal Creep: .................................. 40 
D. Rejecting the Incentive Model as the Primary Justification for Design Patents ............. 41 
IV. The Problem of Overlapping Rights ........................................................................................ 45 
V. Conclusions and Suggestions ...................................................................................................... 48 
VI. Appendix I .................................................................................................................................... 50 
A. Court decisions involving combined accusations of design patent and trade dress 
infringement. .................................................................................................................................. 50 
B. Recent complaints filed involving combined accusations of design patent and trade 






                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri Law School. I presented early versions of this work at 
Stanford, Washington University, University of Texas, University of Georgia, and University of Missouri.  The 
faculty and guests at those discussions provided invaluable assistance for this project - as did my research assis-
tant, Kevin Dothager. 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656590
 
 
2 Forthcoming, 24 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY ___ (2010) Draft 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a series of cases spanning more than one hundred years, courts and the US patent office 
have made clear that design patents are not to be justified by a fact that the newly invented 
ornamental design aids in distinguishing a company's product from those of its competitors.1  
This article reverses that conclusion and argues instead that the trademark-like distinctive-
ness function that helps eliminate customer confusion is the most compelling policy justifi-
cation for the continued protection of design patent rights in the US.2   
The first volume of the Yale Law Journal (1892) includes an article on design patent protec-
tion.3  Since then, the field of design patent law (and even that original Yale Law Journal ar-
ticle itself) has suffered from a dearth of theory.4  In cursory language, a number of courts 
have suggested that the foundation of design patents policy follows the same incentive-to-
create approach of copyright and utility patent law.5  I reject this traditional incentive model 
                                                 
1 See, William L. Symons, The Law of Patents for Designs 48 (1914) (citing Wright v. Lorenz, 101 O.G. 664; 1902 
C.D. 340); Rowe v. Blodgett & Clapp Co., 112 F. 61 (2nd Cir. 1901).  William H. Browne, A Treatise on the Law of 
Trade-Marks and Analgous Subjects 77 (1873); Francis Upton, A Treatise on the Law of Trade Marks, 17-18 (Albany: 
Weare C. Little, 1860) (arguing that design patent rights are "in no sense a trade-mark property"); Ex parte 
Weinberg, Com. Dec. 244, reprinted in Hector T. Fenton, The Law of Patents for Designs 255 (1889) (distinguishing 
design patents from trade marks); Jay Dratler Jr., Trademark Protections for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
887 (1988) (discussing the relative policy goals of design patents and trademarks). 
2 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164-165 (1995) (trademark law “seeks to promote com-
petition by protecting a firm’s reputation”). William Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intel-
lectual Property law 198-199 (2003).  
3 Frederic Betts, Some Questions Under the Design Patent Act of 1887, 1 Yale L.J. 181 (1892). 
4 The closest attempt to justify design patent law may be a recent article by Daniel Brean who argues that de-
sign patents serve no role other than what is already covered by the laws of copyright and trademark. Daniel H. 
Brean, Enough is Enough: Time to Eliminate Design Patents and Rely on More Appropriate Copyright and Trademark Pro-
tection for Product Designs, 16 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 325 (2008).  Although an important work, Brean incorrectly 
suggests that the Supreme Court expressed consumer protection concerns as the purpose for design patent 
rights in its famous 1871 design patent case of Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871).  Rather, in Gorham, 
the court suggested that the patentees would be injured by competitors misleading products because “a market 
which the patent was granted to secure is destroyed.” Id.  In straightforward language, the Gorham court offers 
its one sentence account of the purposes of design rights as “plainly intended to given encouragement to the 
decorative arts.” Id.  
5 See, for example, Forestek Plating & Mfg. Co. v Knapp-Monarch Co. 106 F2d 554 (6th Cir. 1939); Robert W. Brown 
& Co. v De Bell, 243 F2d 200 (9th Cir. 1957); Hueter v Compco Corp., 179 F2d 416 (7th Cir. 1950) (Purpose of de-
sign patent law is to promote decorative arts and stimulate exercise of inventive faculty in improving appear-
ance of articles of manufacture); Hadco Products, Inc. v Walter Kidde & Co. 462 F2d 1265 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert den 
409 US 1023 (1972) (Purpose of design patent statute is to reward and thereby encourage creative artistic ac-
tivity rather than mere changes of detail which may produce novelty but do not reflect invention, and while 
distinctions in detail may sustain design as novel, they lose significance in establishing nonobviousness.); Avia 
Group International, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (''When function dic-
tates a design, protection would not promote the decorative arts, a purpose of the design patent statute.''). 
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as unlikely to be important in most situations involving ornamental designs.  Rather, I sug-
gest the better justification for design patent doctrine lies in the notion that design patent 
rights serve as an alternative rule of evidence for trade dress protection.6  Along this line, 
design patents simultaneously (a) aid in helping a manufacturer avoid the harm of customer 
confusion and (b) serve as a bulwark against further expansion of trade dress rights.   
Design patents fit into the competition law as a parallel to trade dress rights protectable un-
der the Lanham Act.7 Both regimes focus on the visual appearance of a product or its pack-
aging and both regimes allow the rights-holder to exclude others from uses that lead to cus-
tomer confusion.8 However, design patents are not merely a parallel alternative to trade 
dress.  Rather, the existence of some practical differences means that design patents rights 
are available in situations where trade dress protection is unavailable or uncertain.  For man-
ufacturers and merchants, the practical failings of trade dress law often arise because of un-
derlying design functionality or when the claimant lacks proof of distinctiveness of the de-
sign -- both of which limit the availability of trade dress rights.9  Trade dress doctrine has 
laudable pro-competitive justifications for avoiding overprotection of functional designs.10  
                                                 
6 Trade dress refers to trademark rights protecting the visual appearance of a product or its packaging. Once 
established, the trade dress right-holder may prevent unauthorized uses that are likely to cause confusion as to 
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the goods.  See Part III.A.1, infra. 
7 See 15 U.S.C. §1125; Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (discussing trade dress rights under 
the Lanham Act).  State law trade dress rights also available. See, for example, Swisher Mower & Mach. Co., Inc. v. 
Haban Mfg., Inc., 931 F.Supp. 645 (W.D. Mo. 1996)(discussing Missouri trade dress law).  
8A design patent may be infringed under either Section 271 or 289 of the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. § 271, 289.  In 
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), the Federal Circuit held that design 
patent infringement is proven with evidence that an ordinary customer familiar with the prior art would under-
stand that the accused device "embodies the patented design or any colorable imitation thereof."  Id. (following 
and modifying Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871)). The general test for trade dress infringement asks 
whether a "likelihood of confusion" exists between right-holder's trade dress and the accused trade dress. 15 
U.S.C. §1125; see also Adam L. Brookman, Trademark Law: Protection, Enforcement, and Licensing 69 (Aspen 1999). 
9 See Traffix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (functionality); Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 
205 (2000) (distinctiveness),  
10 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164-165 (1995) (“The functionality doctrine prevents 
trademark law . . . [from] inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product 
feature. . . . If a product’s functional features could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly over such 
features could be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forever.”); 
Traffix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Peter 
Mims, Promotional Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An Economic Model of Trademarks, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 639 (1984) 
(“the [nonfunctionality] doctrine rests on the judgment that the benefits of preventing monopoly power in the 
production of useful goods outweigh the increased search costs caused by duplication of features that have 
secondary meaning”).  Although more limited, some courts have extended the nonfunctionality doctrine to 
limit the protection of trade dress that offers aesthetic functionality.  Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Informa-
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However, as a gap-filler, design patent law includes its own safeguards directed toward en-
suring that the public is not unduly limited in its access to functional articles.  The safeguards 
are largely orthogonal to trade dress limitations, thus facilitating the potential for gap-filling.  
Importantly, patented designs cannot be taken from the public domain.11 Rather to be pa-
tentable, the design must be a demonstrable advance from the prior art.12  Design patent 
protection is also limited by a functionality doctrine.13 Although weak when compared to the 
functionality limits of trademark and copyright laws, the design patent functionality doctrine 
restricts the protection of designs that would block competition on functional aspects of an 
apparatus.14  Perhaps the most important safeguard of design patent law is the narrow inter-
pretation of design patent scope.15  The narrow coverage of a design patent focuses attention 
tightly on follow-on designs that are confusingly similar to the patented design and operates 
to cabin the doctrine. It is not surprising then, that even though copying is not an element of 
                                                                                                                                                 
tion Wealth: Issues and Practices in the Digital Age, 340 (2007) (when “the function of the features is to make the 
product aesthetically pleasing, and protecting them would hinder competition”). 
The functionality doctrine has also been justified as a mechanism for separating trade dress doctrine from that 
of design patents and avoiding overlapping rights.  Jay Dratler Jr., Trademark Protections for Industrial Designs, 1988 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 887 (1988) (discussing the high standard for patentability of a design patent).  C. Scott Hemphill 
and Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1147, 1199 (2009) (“Design patents 
provide protection in a few cases, but their demanding standards for protection and long lead time make them 
of limited use for most fashion articles.”); I argue in part VI that courts likely over-emphasize the “problem” of 
overlapping intellectual property rights – especially in the area of design patent rights.  
11 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 171, 102, and 103(a) (patent may only be granted when design is new, novel, and nonob-
vious, respectively).  The Patent Act allows an applicant a one-year grace period in filing its design patent appli-
cation after a public disclosure or offer for sale of a product embodying the newly invented design. 35 U.S.C. § 
102(b). 
12 This is a contrast to trademark and trade dress law, which allows business to claim rights over designs that 
were previously in the public domain. Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (“The trade-mark may be, and 
generally is, the adoption of something already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the party using it.”). 
13 See, Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(holding that design patent covering a 
particular key shape was impermissibly functional because it blocked all alternative designs that would perform 
the same function of opening a particular lock); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Trade Dress & De-
sign Law ch. 5 (2010). 
14 Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
15 In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Design patents have almost no scope."); Elmer v. ICC Fa-
bricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Brooks Furniture Mfg. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1383 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (design patents are entitled to almost no scope beyond the precise content of the patent draw-
ings); Hartco Engineering, Inc. v. Wang's Intern., Inc., 142 Fed.Appx. 455 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (design patent given nar-
row interpretation).  The scope of protection was expanded by the en banc Federal Circuit in Egyptian Goddess, 
Inc., v. Swisa, Inc., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 20104 (Fed. Cir. Sept 22, 2008). Although expanded, the scope of 
design patent rights remain quite limited. See Dion Bergman & Elizabeth Morris, Re-Designing Designs: The Recent 
Egyptian Goddess Case Has Brought a Relative Backwater of IP Protection into the Mainstream, Intellectual Property To-
day, Feb. 25, 2009, at 4 (describing Egyptian Goddess’s pro-patentee holding as breathing new life into design 
law). 
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design patent infringement, a significant portion of design patent infringement litigation is 
directed toward stopping accused infringers from free-riding on the consumer appeal of the 
patented design.16 
Along with these limits, design patent protection also offers the public benefit of explicit 
identification of the scope of protection and timing of rights.17 This documentation helps 
avoid the potential problems of probabilistic gaming and creeping expansion of the scope of 
claimed rights that plague other doctrines - such as unregistered trade dress and copy-
rights.18  Likewise the limit on duration means that administrative mistakes in over-granting 
rights are naturally self-correcting even when transaction costs are high.19 Design patent law 
may offer a lower-transaction-cost mechanism for detangling the design creation process 
from the related endeavors of marketing and manufacturing by allowing “naked” assignment 
of design patent rights.20  From a social-relations framework, this explicit delineation of 
rights in industrial design can serve to avoid the clash of multiple claimants especially in the 
employer-employee relationship.21 
                                                 
16 See Part II.C (providing an analysis of design patent infringement cases).  
17 C.f. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 
8-25 (2008) (arguing that utility patents fail to provide sufficient notice of rights). 
To obtain design patent protection, an inventor must apply for and be granted protection. This initial hurdle 
appears to weed-out many potential problematic claimants. Jonathan S. Masur, Process as Purpose: Administrative 
Procedure, Costly Screens, and Examination at the Patent Office (U. Chi. John M. Olin Program in L. & Econ., Work-
ing Paper No. 393, 2008), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/393.pdf; William Patry, Moral 
Panics and the Copyright Wars 69 (2009) (discussing problems created by automatic copyright protection) 
18 See Wal-Mart v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (("We hold that, in an action for infringement of unregis-
tered trade dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product's design is distinctive, and therefore pro-
tectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning."); But see Glenn Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor's New 
Clothes: Why Trade Dress Does Not Belong on the Principal Register, 51 Hastings L.J. 1131 (2000); Lisa H. Johnston, 
Note, Drifting Toward Trademark Rights in Gross, 85 Trademark Rep. 19 (1995) (illustrating four examples of how 
trademark protection has drifted toward allowing trademark rights in gross: “(1) trademark licensing, with par-
ticular regard to promotional trademark licensing, (2) protection for trade dress absent a showing of secondary 
meaning, (3) protection for trademarks with secondary meaning in the making, and (4) dilution protection ac-
corded by state statutes”). 
19 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (n.s.) 386, 404 (1937) (recognizing that high transaction 
costs can hinder transfer of resources to a higher valued user).  
20 As a general rule, trademark rights may not be assigned in gross without the associated goodwill of the prod-
uct or service associated with the mark. See Allison Sell McDade, Trading in Trademarks—Why the Anti-
Assignment in Gross Doctrine Should be Abolished When Trademarks Are Used As Collateral, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 465, 479 
(1998). 
21 See Thornton Robison, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law About Trade Secrets, 25 Ariz. L. Rev. 347, 
370 (1983) (noting problems with the lack of specificity of trade secret law). 
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If seen as a powerful tool, design patent law may also serve as a bulwark against further judi-
cial and statutory expansion of trade dress and copyright laws into the realm of functional 
designs. This thesis is implicitly supported by the Supreme Court’s 2000 trade-dress case in-
volving Wal-Mart and Samara Brothers.22 In Wal-mart, the Court categorically rejected the sug-
gestion that a product design may be inherently distinctive under the trademark laws and 
called upon the existence and availability of design patents as a partial justification for limit-
ing trade dress availability.23 A corollary to this bulwark thesis is that design patents might 
not forestall (and may even promote) potentially undesirable cross-expansion if design pa-
tent rights are seen as trivial, cumbersome, or too weak an alternative.24 That result can be 
inferred from the generation-old 6th Circuit Court of Appeals decision that noted the com-
parative disadvantages of design patent procurement -- namely the time and expense re-
quired to obtain protection.25  As explained in the following paragraph, I largely reject this 
conventional wisdom that the procurement process makes design patents far-inferior to 
trade dress rights. 
                                                 
22 Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
23 Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); See also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 
159, 164-165 (1995) (limiting the scope of trademark law based on the alternative potential design patent rights 
available); Bretford Mfg. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Corp., 419 F.3d 576, 580 (7th Cir. Ill. 2005) (denying trade dress rights 
and identifying the availability of design patent rights); Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 
1012 (7th Cir. Ill. 2005); ADA v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. Ill. 1997) (although item is not 
copyrightable, it may be protected under design patent laws); Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 
978-979 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1987) (“Courts must proceed with caution in assessing claims to unregistered trademark 
protection in the design of products so as not to undermine the objectives of the patent laws.”). 
24  See, John H. Lewin, The Associated Press Decision – An extension of the Sherman Act, 13 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
247, 262 n. 27 (1945-1946); Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) 
(holding (1) that a copyright in the drawing of a dress did not protect the dress itself and (2) that the dress itself 
could be protected under design patent law – although that patent may well be worthless because of the delay 
in obtaining protection).; Jennifer L. Barwinski, Comment, Trade Dress: Should Only the Secondary Meaning Trade 
Dress Standard Apply to Product Packaging? Or Should Courts Continue to Use the Inherently Distinctive Standard?, 8 Marq. 
Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 119, 126 (2004)(“[T]he Court's solution [in Wal-Mart] may not be comforting to producers 
since patent and copyright protections are for [limited] terms, whereas trade dress protection is perpetual if 
renewed.”).  Jennifer A. Konefal, Dastar: Federal Trademark Law in an Uncertain State, 11 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 
283 (2005) (noting that trademark protection is “usually seen as better suited than design patents for protecting 
the merchandising property … because by the time a design patent is issued, usually between two and three 
years after date of filing, often the mark will have lost some of its popularity.”). Protection of Intellectual Property, 35 
Ill. L. Rev. 546, 548  n. 6 (1940-1941) (The “time, expense, and the ephemeral nature of dress designs make 
resort to [design] patent impractical, even though they may meet the test of attractiveness and novelty.”). Milli-
nery Creator’s Guild v. F.T.C., 109 F.2d 175, 177 (1940); 31 Col. L. Rev. 477 (1931). 
25 Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1168 n.2 (6th Cir. 1980) (''where copyright is available, it is 
more popular than the design patent largely because copyrights are far easier and less expensive to obtain than 
design patents.''). Schnadig is but one example. The design patent process has been repeatedly described as both 
slow and cumbersome. See Thorvald Soldberg, The Present Copyright Situation, 40 Yale L. J. 184 (1930-1931). 
  
      Dennis Crouch 7 
 
This article presents a new set of empirical results to support the theoretical construct that 
design patents fill a gap in trade dress law protection.  Based on the data, I tentatively reject 
the oft-stated conventional wisdom that design patents are worthless for many because they 
are too slow, expensive, and difficult to obtain.26 Rather, based on a first-of-its-kind analysis 
of the prosecution history files of a large sample of recently issued design patents,27 I con-
clude that the current design patent examination system operates as a de facto registration sys-
tem.  Notably, more than ninety-eight percent (98%) of the patents in my study were issued 
without the Patent Office challenging their inventiveness.28  The dramatic rise in the number 
of design patents being issued indicates that designers find value in design patent protection, 
and a study of parallel design patent and trade dress litigation suggests that design patents 
are serving as a back-up or replacement for trade dress rights.  
Some critics of strong intellectual property rights have increasingly derided the hodgepodge 
relationship between various forms of intellectual property protection that often allow for 
extensive overlap of rights.29  According to the theory, the successive layers of rights have a 
chilling effect on competition, and even when each layer of rights is relatively weak, a mas-
sive parallelism of rights may still be so overwhelming as to chill competition or culturally 
beneficial uses.  The subject matter of a design patent is susceptible to overlapping protec-
tion and may well be simultaneously protectable through design patent, copyright, trade 
dress, utility patent, and trade secret laws.30  Even further, a design patent can serve a key 
role in expanding the duration and quality of rights through a process that I term doctrinal 
                                                 
26 See Jay Dratler Jr., Trademark Protections for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. Ill. L. Rev. 887 (1988) (discussing the 
high standard for patentability of a design patent). 
27  The prosecution history includes the paperwork associated with every action by the USPTO and every filing 
by the patent applicants.  See Lemley and Sampat, Examining Patent Examination, 2010 Stanford Tech. L. Rev. 2, 
3 (discussing extraction of USPTO prosecution history data). 
28 A larger percentage of design patents were rejected during prosecution based on more clerical failures. 
29 Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1473, 1493 (2004); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 Yale L.J. 1163, 
1174-75 (1999) (describing how “the proliferation of intellectual property rights in upstream research may be 
stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the course of research and product development”); Mi-
chael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 
SCIENCE 698, 700 (1998) (emphasizing fragmentation and arguing that it creates an anticommons in IP). 
30 See David W. Opderbeck, Form and Function: Protecting Trade Dress Rights in Product Configurations, 20 Seton Hall 
Legis. J. 1, 2 (1996) (raising the prospect of product design being protected through design patents, copyright, 
and trade dress). 
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bootstrapping.31  I consider three mechanisms where doctrinal bootstrapping occurs in the 
dyad of design patent and trade dress rights: (1) By providing a significant period of exclu-
sivity, design patents can aid in the process of developing an association in the eyes of cus-
tomers between the design and its source.  That association then serves as evidence to sup-
port trade dress protection. (2) Although the design patent functionality doctrine differs 
from that of trade dress, courts have also relied on design patents as evidence that the design 
(or at least aspects of the design) are non-functional. This might be termed the “reverse-
Traffix doctrine.”32 In the first two mechanisms, design patents operate by increasing the li-
kelihood that trade dress rights are later recognized.  (3) In the third mechanism, the design 
patents operate to extend the patent term at the front-end based on the relatively rapid grant 
of patent rights.   
Although the concerns of harms associated with overlapping claims can be legitimate, over-
lapping claims occur in most areas of law, and the complexity here does not appear on any 
greater scale than a when criminal defendant faces multiple charges in multiple courts all 
based on a single action.  I posit that the narrow scope of design patent protection addition-
ally limits the potential overlapping rights problems. 
At one level, the value of this project is largely self evident. Any government action needs to 
be justified -- especially a system such as design patent law where the government continues 
to grant exclusive rights to control the market for yet-to-be manufactured items. The sparse 
design patent statutes leave large gaps and little guidance for judicial interpretation, and an 
understanding of the purposes behind the design patent system is an important step in in-
terpreting those statutes.  The particular policy justification is important today on the legisla-
tive side as various interest groups lobby to modify rights in industrial design.33  Internation-
ally, Europe has a successful new design registration system and China reports a dramatic 
                                                 
31 Doctrinal bootstrapping is the process of using rights granted under a first doctrine to aid in procuring rights 
under a second doctrine. I argue that design patents are being used to help obtain trade dress protection over 
the same industrial design.  
32 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001)(holding that the existence of a utility patent 
creates a presumption of design functionality).  At a minimum, the existence of a design patent may at least 
counterbalance the parallel existence of a utility patent covering the same item.  
33 David Goldenberg, The Long and Winding Road, A History of the Fight Over Industrial Design Protection 
in the United States, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 21 (1997). 
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and rapid increase in design patent applications during the past few years.34  As the law de-
velops, it is important to have at least some grasp on the underlying purposes of the law.  
Structure of this Article: Part II outlines current law and practice of design patent protection.  
This part includes a presentation of novel empirical results suggesting that the current design 
patent prosecution process is much more akin to a registration system than one involving 
substantive examination of patentability.  Part II also presents evidence of the current use of 
design patents as complementary to trade dress rights.  Part III attempts to rationalize a so-
cial policy of granting design patent rights by applying the justification models introduced 
above.  Part IV extends the analysis of Part III by fitting design patents into the overall 
scheme of intellectual property protection.  Notably, this part considers the impact of over-
lapping protection regimes.  Part V presents a number of conclusions and recommendations 
for moving forward. 
II.  CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE OF DESIGN PATENT PROTECTION  
U.S. design patents protect a category of intellectual innovation often termed “industrial de-
sign.”35  A design patent is available to the inventor of “any new, original, and ornamental 
design for an article of manufacture”36 and remains in force for fourteen years from the date 
of issue unless invalidated or abandoned.37 The patentability requirements differ substantially 
                                                 
34 The European Union introduced a design right registration system in 2003. The system has been popular and 
in 2008, over 75,000 designs were registered.  OHIM Annual Report 2008 at 
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/resource/documents/OHIM/OHIMPublications/2008_annual_report_en.pd
f. In 2009, China granted over 200,000 design patents. See http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/statistics.  
Although important motivators for this article, a discussion of international design rights is beyond its scope.  
35 See, deNoblet, J., Industrial Design, Paris: A.F.A.A. (1993); Edward Lucie-Smith, A History of Industrial 
Design 7 (1983) (“it is the business of determining the form of objects which are to be made by machines, 
rather than produced by hand. . . . [i]ndustrial design can concern itself with everything from a teacup to a 
jet airplane.”). See U.S. Pat. Nos. D. 602,742 (claiming the ornamental design for an insulated paper cup) 
and D. 388,048 (claiming the ornamental design for a helicopter).  
36 35 U.S.C. § 171. Section 171 is the design patent enabling statute and is roughly parallel to the much debated 
Section 101 of the Patent Act which defines the scope of patentable subject matter for utility patent protection. 
See, Bilski v. Kappos, ___ U.S. ___ (2010)(re-writing the law of subject matter eligiblity for newly invented 
processes).  Section 101 focuses on the requirements necessary for a utility patent and requires a “new and use-
ful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”  
Thus, to eligible for a utility patent, an invention must meet the three basic elements of being (1) new; (2) use-
ful; and (3) classifiable in one of the four statutory categories of inventions: process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter.  Following this in parallel, a patentable design must meet four basic elements of being 
(1) new; (2) original; (3) ornamental; and (4) a design for an article of manufacture. 
37 35 U.S.C. § 173 (“Patents for designs shall be granted for the term of fourteen years from the date of 
grant.”). As with other forms of intellectual property, the term associated with design patent rights has in-
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from the more well-known utility patents which protect useful advances in technology rather 
than ornamental designs.38  However, both types of patents share core features relating to 
the processes of obtaining and enforcing patent rights.39 Features of industrial designs are 
also protected through other forms of intellectual property and tort laws at both the state 
and national levels.  A new design for an athletic shoe may, for instance, be protected by de-
sign patents,40 trademark rights (trade dress),41 copyrights,42 and trade secrets.43  Depending 
upon the circumstances, the rights-holder may also have causes of action for misappropria-
tion or unfair competition.44 
A significant number of US design patents are issued each year. In the fiscal-year 2009, for 
instance, over 23,000 design patents were issued – primarily covering commercial embodi-
                                                                                                                                                 
creased over the years.  The original 1842 Act offered only seven years of protection for design patents. 5 Stat. 
543 (1842).  
38 See Distinction Between Design and Utility Patents, Manual of Patent Examination Procedure (M.P.E.P.) § 
1502.1 (2009).  
39 See 35 U.S.C. 171 ("The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for 
designs, except as otherwise provided.").  Like utility patents, design patent protection is under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Federal Government. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 
(1989)(holding that the power of states to create “patent-like rights” has been preempted by the federal gov-
ernment through the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution.); Sash Controls, Inc. v. Talon, L.L.C., 185 F.3d 
882 (Table) (Fed. Cir. 1999) (nonprecedential) (“Design patents must meet the same novelty and nonobvious 
requirements as utility patents.”). 
40 About two percent of the design patents issued in 2009 were directed to some form of “shoe.” These results 
are based on searches conducted on the USPTO.gov website. See also, Dennis Crouch, Design Patent Litigation, 
PATENTLY-O (Sept. 4, 2007) at http://patentlyo.com/patent/2007/09/design-patent-l.html (shoe-related 
patents are the most commonly litigated type of design patent).   
Based on a search of USPTO assignment information, Nike, Inc. is the leading owner of shoe-related design 
patents.  Nike has also been an aggressive enforcer of its design patent rights. See, Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., Case No. 08-cv-5840 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (complaint filed October 13, 2008 alleging that Wal-Mart was selling 
infringing shoes); Dennis Crouch, Protecting Design Patents on Shoes, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 16, 2008) at http:// 
patentlyo.com/patent/2008/10/protecting-desi.html.   
41 See cancelled U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1550230 (design of a K-Swiss tennis shoe).  
42 Copyright protection is available only when the original features sought to be protected are at least concep-
tually separable from the function of an object. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 216 (1954).  
43 See, William McCall, “Oregon man charged with trade secrets theft over 2008 Nike catalog”, Associated 
Press Financial Wire, (November 10, 2007); Brent Hunsberger, “Columbia sues Crocs over trade secrets dis-
pute”, The Oregonian (December 8, 2009); Easton Sports, Inc. v. Warrior Lacrosse, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
37050 (E.D. Mich. September 14, 2005).   
44 Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc. v. Converse Inc., 175 Fed. Appx. 672 (5th Cir. 2006) (reversing dismissal of un-
fair competition and dilution claims) 
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ments of consumer goods.45 In addition to athletic shoes,46 these include apparel,47 eyeglasses 
and sunglasses,48 automobile parts,49 furniture,50 lamps and light-bulbs,51 medical devices,52 
handheld electronic devices,53 sports equipment,54 computer screen icons,55 bottles,56 etc.  
The number of design patents issued each year has increased over time.  The most dramatic 
rise has been over the past 25 years. Chart 1 shows the number of issued design patents each 
                                                 
45 As a comparison, during FY 2009, the USPTO granted 165,212 utility patents and issued 180,520 certificates 
of trademark registration.  FY 2009 USPTO Performance and Accountability Report § 5.5, Tables 5 and 18 at 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2009/index.jsp. 
46 See Supra, note 40. 
47 See U.S. Pat. No. D. 601,326 covering the ornamental design for a swimsuit. 
48 See, U.S. Design Pat. No. D. 470,176 covering the ornamental design for eyeglass components.  Oakley, Inc., 
holds numerous patents related to sunglasses and, over the past several years, has filed over thirty lawsuits as-
serting design patent infringement against alleged counterfeiters.  See, Dennis Crouch, Oakley's Sunglasses and 
Design Patents, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 23, 2008) available at http://patentlyo.com/patent/2008/03/oakelys-sun-
gla.html. 
49 Dennis Crouch, Auto Parts Designs, PATENTLY-O (June 8, 2008) available at 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2008/06/ford-global-tec.html. 
50 See Jake Wharton, Innovation USA Files Design Patent Action Against Ido Furniture, Furniture Law Blog 
(April 29, 2009) at http://womblefurniturelaw.blogspot.com/2009/04/innovation-usa-files-design-patent.html  
51 See, U.S. Design Pat No. D 170,445 covering the ornamental design of a base for a table lamp. The '445 pa-
tent was cited by the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. at 216 (1954) as evidence that the coverage of 
design patents overlaps with that of copyright.  “Petitioner has furnished the Court a booklet of numerous 
design patents for statuettes, bases for table lamps and similar articles for manufacture, quite indistinguishable 
in type from the copyrighted statuettes here in issue.” Id. In Mazer, the court held that the potential for overlap 
does not bar copyright of a work of art. Id. (“the patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does 
not bar copyright as works of art”). 
52 See, U.S. Design Pat. No. D. 583,928 for a Nebulizer and U.S. Design Pat. No. D. 583,949 covering the or-
namental design of a sphygmomanometer. 
53 U.S. Design Pat. No. D. 497,618 shows the familiar design of the Apple iPod.  Dennis Crouch, iPod Receives 
Design Patent, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 27, 2004) available at 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2004/10/ipod_receives_d.html. See also, Dennis Crouch, Design Patents: Control-
ling Pendency, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 28, 2007) (noting that one of Apple’s “issued iPod design patents . . . appears 
identical to the company’s trademark design application") at 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/12/design-patents.html. Although design patent and trade dress 
rights may well overlap in coverage, the rights will often be staggered in time.  In the case mentioned here, for 
instance, the design patent covering a commercial embodiment of an Apple iPod product issued well before 
trade dress rights have been registered.  The design patent rights will eventually expire after fourteen years. 
However, by that time, the trade dress rights may be well established and may extend in perpetuity.  
54 See, U.S. Design Pat. No. D. 583,887 covering the ornamental design of a golf putter head.  
55 Microsoft Corporation holds over three hundred design patents directed to computer icons and icon groups. 
(Search of USPTO patent records). 
56 The Coca-Cola Company holds more than one hundred design patents on beverage bottle shapes, including 
U.S. Design Pat. No. D. 458,145 which covers the shape of the bottle used for by its subsidiary Simply Orange 
Juice Orange Company. 
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year since the first design patent issued in 1842.57   One implication of the rise in design pa-
tents is simply that more designs are being created each year. However, the more likely con-
clusion is that designers have discovered that design patents hold some value that now out-
weighs the cost of pursuing protection. 
 
A.  Design Patents and Their Low Standard of Patentability: Doctrine 
Although the doctrines differ in their fundamental subject matter scope, most design patent 
requirements and limitations track those of utility patent law.58 One example of this parallel 
application is in the anticipation and nonobviousness requirement for both design and utility 
patents.59 A design patent is anticipated – and thus invalid – when a “single prior art refer-
                                                 
57 See U.S. Patent Statistics Report at http://uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm.  
58 The Patent Act includes a catch-all provision that “except as otherwise provided,” the statutes “relating to 
patents for inventions shall apply to patents for designs.” 5 U.S.C. § 171. The statute itself is rather enigmatic 
because it provides no guidance as to what may be “otherwise provided.” For further background, see Robert 
S. Katz, Examination of Design Patents in the United States, 10 U. Balt. Intell. Prop. L.J. 109, 116 (2002) (noting that 
the obviousness standard is de facto less stringent for design patents than for utility patents); See also Scott D. 
Locke, Fifth Avenue and the Patent Lawyer: Strategies for Using Design Patents to Increase the Value of Fashion and Luxury 
Goods Companies, 5 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 40, 40 (2005); Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 
34 UCLA L. Rev. 1341, 1356 (1987).  
59 The provisions regarding novelty and non-obviousness are found in 35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty) and 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103(a) (non-obviousness) respectively. 
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ence” is shown to be “identical in all material respects to the claimed invention.”60 A design 
patent is obvious – and likewise invalid – if, at the time of the invention, the claimed orna-
mental design considered as a whole “would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in 
the art.”61 
The doctrinal requirements of novelty and nonobviousness are seemingly in tension with the 
conventional wisdom that most new ornamental designs are created by combining old and 
familiar forms in some new way.62 In an early 20th century light-fixture design patent case, 
Judge Augustus Hand recognized this combination phenomena and the result “that originali-
ty and aesthetic skill” is generally evidenced in the combination of elements rather than the 
newness of individual elements:  
It is to be remembered that ornaments resulting from the varied juxtaposition 
of curves and angles, like the musical combinations resulting from the se-
quence of notes and chords, all contain certain intervals -- ornaments intervals 
of space, music intervals of sound -- which are traditional and well known. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, after years of development, to imagine any article of 
ornament or any production of music of which this is not true. It is in the ar-
rangement, or, to use the technical term of the patent law, the combination, of 
elements, and probably at this late day in that alone, that originality and aes-
thetic skill may be evidenced.63 
                                                 
60 Door-Master Corp. v. Yorktowne, Inc., 256 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Quoting Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 
F.3d 1456, 1461, 43 USPQ2d 1887, 1890 (Fed.Cir.1997)).  
61 The obviousness statute, 35 U.S.C. §103(a), reads as follows: “A patent may not be obtained …  if the differ-
ences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a 
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention 
was made.” For its application to design patents, see, Avia Group Intern., Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 
F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming the lower court’s holding that an “ordinary designer would not have 
found the [asserted shoe] designs, considered as whole designs, obvious in light of the differences between the 
prior art and the claimed designs.”); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1440-41, 221 USPQ 97, 
108 (Fed.Cir.1984) (“In design patent case, the fictitious person of ordinary skill is the designer of ordinary 
capability who designs articles of the type presented in the application.”); In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1215 
(CCPA 1981).   
62 See Amicus Brief of the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) in Support of the Petition 
for Rehearing in Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int’l, Inc., 2006 WL 1287642 (2006) (suggesting that most new 
ornamental designs are largely a reorganization and recombination of old and familiar forms). 
63 Friedley-Voshardt Co. v. Reliance Metal Spinning Co., 238 F. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); See also William L. Symons, The 
Law of Patents for Designs 14 (1914) (“But althouth it must be ‘a thing of beauty’ it is not necessary that it show 
any high degree of esthetic excellence.”).  
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Judge Hand’s perspective on the general low inventive level of product design is common 
today even by industrial designers themselves. In his forward to the 1993 book INDUSTRIAL 
DESIGN, noted designer Sir Terence Conran defined design as “98 per cent common sense 
and 2 per cent aesthetics.”64 Sir Conran does highlight one process that is even quicker and 
easier than simple common sense: “It is always cheaper in the short term to copy somebody 
else’s ideas and short termism is the curse of much of industry.”65 
Over the years, courts have regularly denounced combination patents as obvious.66  In re-
jecting the patent on a then-modern supermarket check-out system, the 1950 Supreme 
Court indicated that courts should “scrutinize combination patent claims with a care propor-
tioned to the difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an assembly of old ele-
ments.”67  Repeating that same mantra, the 2007 Supreme Court wrote in KSR Int’l. v. Telef-
lex, Inc., that the “combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to 
be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”68  In KSR, the Court faced 
an issue common to design patent litigation – determining obviousness when the patented 
invention is entirely composed of elements that are each individually found in the prior art.69 
The A&P and KSR cases focused on utility patents, but they also impact design patent juri-
sprudence because the same obviousness statute – 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) – is applied to both 
patent types.70 
There are many reasons to believe that design patent rights remain viable even in the face of 
the Court’s seemingly tough stance against combination patents.  First, a hard look at the 
                                                 
64 Sir Terrance Conran, Forward: Industrial Design from 1851 into the 21st Century in INDUSTRIAL DESIGN REFLEC-
TIONS OF A CENTURY (Jocelyn de Noblet, ed. 1993). 
65 Id.  
66 See, for example, Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 679 (1893); Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermar-
ket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
67 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950).   
68 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
69 Id. (holding that an endeavor that merely  implements a predictable variation of already known work is likely 
unpatentable).  
70 See Sash Controls, Inc. v. Talon, L.L.C., 185 F.3d 882 (Table) (Fed. Cir. 1999) (nonprecedential) (“Design pa-
tents must meet the same novelty and nonobvious requirements as utility patents.”); In Titan Tire Corp. v. Case 
New Holland, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74173 (S.D. Iowa October 3, 2007), the district court applied KSR in 
denying a design patentee’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief. In its decision, the court found a “substan-
tial question of invalidity” because the claimed ornamental design may be “a predictable variation that could 
have been implemented by a person of ordinary skill.”  
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innovative concept in many designs may well reveal that Judge Hand and Conran are wrong 
and that design innovations are typically more nuanced than simply a compilation of known 
design elements predictably assembled using common sense.71 Second, courts have not truly 
settled on how the utility patent case law of KSR will apply to design patents.72  This link be-
tween the law of utility patents and the law of design patents remains somewhat undeve-
loped.  When a major case changes utility patent doctrine, there is often “resulting uncertain-
ty” as courts and rights-holders struggle to understand whether the change will apply across 
the doctrinal gap.73  
A comparatively low standard of patentability was recognized even before Judge Hand’s ear-
ly 20th century decision. In his 1914 treatise, Symons noted that design patents are “often 
prosecuted as if it were not necessary that the design should be the result of invention in order 
to be patentable.”74 In the 1889 case of Untermeyer v. Freund,75 the New York court found it-
self “convinced that the courts, though applying the same rules, have looked with greater 
leniency upon design patents than patents for other inventions.”76 And, in 1871 the commis-
                                                 
71 Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Rethinking the Origins of the Design Patent Standard 64 (draft with au-
thor) (2009) (suggesting that the design process is more complex than the usual nonobviousness analysis would 
allow);  Janice Mueller and Daniel Brean, Overcoming the 'Impossible Issue' of Nonobviousness in Design 
Patents, (November 12, 2009). U. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-30. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1505384; Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
887, 892 (1988) (“The designer’s art focuses not on the creation of new and non-obvious techniques of this 
type, but on the use of old ones in well-known ways to develop useful products”). 
72 Janice Mueller and Daniel Brean, Overcoming the 'Impossible Issue' of Nonobviousness in Design Patents 
(November 12, 2009). U. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-30. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1505384 (suggesting that the USPTO and courts have "flexibility" in their applica-
tion of the nonobviousness standards). 
73 Robert S. Katz, Design Patents in DRAFTING PATENTS FOR LITIGATION AND LICENSING 564 (ABA, Bradley 
C. Wright ed. 2008).   
74 William L. Symons, The Law of Patents for Designs 41 (1914). 
75 37 F. 342 (S.D. New York 1889)(finding for the patentee).  
76 Id.; See also Smith v. Stewart, 55 F. 481 (E.D. Penn. 1893) (“The invention in a majority of patent designs is 
very small and of a lower order. All the statute, as commonly interpreted, requires is the production of a new 
and pleasing design which may add value to the object for which it is intended. The invention consists in the 
conception, and production of this, however simple it may be.”); but see Ex parte Christopher M. Cordley, 5 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 11 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd. App. Apr. 3, 1930) (requiring that a patentable design be 
based upon a “meritorious invention”). One explanation for the appearance of a lower de facto nonobviousness 
standard for designs as opposed to utility patents may be based on the “level of ordinary skill in the art” used 
as a frame of reference in determining nonobviousness. In design patents, the level of skill is typically an “ordi-
nary designer” which courts may see as a lower level skill as compared to an ordinary engineer or scientist.  
According to the theory, a given design would be less likely to be seen as obvious in the eyes of a lesser skilled 
designer. 
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sioner of patents – in instituting a new set of more stringent rules – held out that up to then 
“[t]he practice of the Office in granting design patents ha[d] been not only liberal, but lax.”77 
B.  Design Patents and Their Low Standard of Patentability: Empirical Results 
More recent conventional wisdom has been somewhat mixed as to the USPTO's gatekeeper 
role in the area of design patents.78 While some have agreed with the 19th Century patent of-
fice commissioners that the USPTO applies lax standards for granting design patent rights, 
others have identified the USPTO's "demanding standards for protection and long lead 
time."79 To test the ongoing accuracy of this conventional wisdom, I created several unique 
data sets of design patent prosecution and litigation information.  The multiple sources of 
data allowed me to consider the design patenting process from several angles.  
                                                 
77 Parkinson, 251 C.D. 1871 (Pat. Off. Decision 1871); cited in William L. Symons, The Law of Patents for Designs 
1 (1914) (“A few years later in discussing a question which was often raised in design cases, the Commissioner 
of Patents said: - ‘It is not to be denied that the record of the Office on this question is somewhat ragged.’” 
Quoting Shoeniger, 15 O.G. 384). 
78 For a general discussion of the gatekeeper role of the USPTO, see Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the 
Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1508-11 (2001) ("The strong implication ... is that society ought to resign 
itself to the fact that bad patents will issue, and attempt to deal with the problem ex post, if the patent is as-
serted in litigation."). But see John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent 
Administration Reform, 17 Berkley Tech. L.J. 727, 730-40 (2002); Julie Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of 
Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1091 (1995) (arguing 
that the PTO had failed its gatekeeper role with respect to software patents). Discussion of the gatekeeper role 
in the trademark realm see Tammy J. Snyder, Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 and the Gatekeeper Role of the 
PTO: Heading Abuse off at the Pass, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 753 (1990). 
79 C. Scott Hemphill and Jennie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1147, 1199 
(2009) (“Design patents provide protection in a few cases, but their demanding standards for protection and 
long lead time make them of limited use for most fashion articles.”); Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fa-
shion Design, in 1 Intellectual Property and Information Wealth: Copyright and Related Rights 115 (Peter K. Yu 
ed., 2006); Jennifer A. Konefal, Dastar: Federal Trademark Law in an Uncertain State, 11 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 283 
(2005) (noting that trademark protection is “usually seen as better suited than design patents for protecting the 
merchandising property … because by the time a design patent is issued, usually between two and three years 
after date of filing, often the mark will have lost some of its popularity.”). Protection of Intellectual Property, 35 Ill. 
L. Rev. 546, 548  n. 6 (1940-1941) (The “time, expense, and the ephemeral nature of dress designs make resort 
to [design] patent impractical, even though they may meet the test of attractiveness and novelty.”); Chas. D. 
Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1952) ("To obtain a valid design patent is exceeding-
ly difficult. Probably that explains why plaintiff did not even apply for a patent."); Peter Schalestock, Forms of 
Redress for Design Piracy: How Victims Can Use Existing Copyright Law, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 113, 118 (1997) 
(administrative delays in obtaining rights make design patents impractical); Thomas M. Byron, As Long as 
There's Another Way: Pivot Point v. Charlene Products as an Accidental Template for a Creativity-Driven Useful Articles 
Analysis, 49 IDEA 147 (2009); Brandon Scruggs, Should Fashion Design Be Copyrightable?, 6 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. 
Prop. 122, 134 (2007) (stating that design patents do no work to protect fashion); Joseph E. McNamara, Modify-
ing the Design Piracy Prohibition Act to Offer “Opt-Out” Protection for Fashion Designs, 56 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 505, 
517 (Winter/Spring 2009) (“Although much of fashion design is within the scope of design patent protection, 
obtaining a design patent can be expensive, and the requirements for protection are demanding relative to the 
requirements for copyright and to the requirements proposed in the DPPA.”). 
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Based on the data, I argue that the US design patent examination system is operating as a de 
facto registration system rather than as one based on a true examination.80  As described be-
low, design patent prosecution is a relatively quick, inexpensive, and assured process without 
substantive examination as compared with either utility patent prosecution or trade dress 
registration.  
1.  Sources of Design Patent Data 
For this study, I created a first dataset of over three hundred thousand design patents – in-
cluding every design patent issued between January 192081 and January 2010.82 The dataset 
includes information from the cover-sheet of each of these patents.  The biographical in-
formation gleaned from the patent documents was correlated with a second dataset that in-
cludes more detailed information regarding each patent issued since 2004.  In addition, I 
identified particular design patents that had been litigated since 1986. For lawsuits filed since 
2000, I also used the Stanford’s IP Litigation Clearinghouse database and the Federal Courts 
docketing database PACER.83 The Stanford data was correlated with pleadings downloaded 
from both LexisNexis and Westlaw.  
2.  Rising Numbers of Design Patent Applications  
Patenting has been on the rise for two generations.  Between 1963 and 2007, for instance, 
the number of patent application filings increased more than five-fold for both utility and 
design patents.84 (See Chart 1). Most of this rise in patenting activity has occurred since the 
                                                 
80 Commissioner Leggett recommended in the early 1870s that the design patent system be modified to be-
come a registry system. Annual Report to Congress of the United States Patent Office 17 (Gov’t Printing Of-
fice 1872); See C.C. Reif, Mortimer D. Leggett, 2 J. Pat. Office Society 534, 540 (1918) (noting that Leggett’s posi-
tion continued to have “many” sympathizers in 1918). See also Thomas Ewbank, Annual Report of the Commis-
sioner of Patents, S. Doc. No. 118, 16 (1852) (“It is believed that a registry law might be beneficially substituted 
for the law relating to designs.  It would be more comprehensive, and better calculated to secure the objects 
sought, than the law at present in force.”); 
81 The patent with the lowest number in the dataset is U.S. Design Patent No. D. 242,700 for an “Automotive 
Vehicle” issued to Guillermo Viniegra of Mexico. 
82 The patent with the highest number in the dataset is U.S. Design Patent No. D 568,000 for a “Razor Han-
dle” and assigned to American Safety Razor. 
83 See http://lexmachina.com. 
84 Data calculated from the USPTO Report, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963 – 2007, available 
at http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/us_stat.htm (accessed on May 30, 2008). 
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formation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982.85 When estab-
lished, the CAFC was seen as a mechanism for unifying as well as strengthening the patent 
laws.86 However, it is unclear to what extent the CAFC has played a role in the increase in 
design patent protection.  The most recent increase in design patenting also correlates with a 
tightening of trade dress doctrine exemplified by Wal-Mart87, TrafFix88, and Dastar.89   
3.  High Allowance Rate of Design Patent Applications 
For the past decade, the allowance rate for design patent applications has remained over 
90%.  There are several methods of calculating patent application allowance rate.90 However, 
because every patent application must eventually be disposed of either by (1) being allowed 
to issue or (2) being abandoned, the most straightforward calculation of the allowance rate is 
a simple calculation of the percentage of disposed-of applications that were allowed.91  This 
information for design patents can be cumulatively found in the USPTO annual reports.92 
The 90+% allowance rate for design patents can be contrasted with the reported 44% allow-
ance rate for utility patent applications.93 Although particular trade dress registration statis-
tics for product designs are not available, the allowance rate for those registration applica-
                                                 
85 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
86 See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619 
(2007); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 Case. W. Res. 
L. Rev. 769, 770 (2004). 
87 Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
88 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
89 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).  
90 See Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office - One More Time, 18 Fed. Cir. B.J. 379 (2009) (discussing methodologies for calculating al-
lowance rates). 
91 This approach ignores patent application lineage. However, that approach is reasonable for design patents 
because relatively few continuation design patent applications are filed.  
92 FY 2009 USPTO Performance and Accountability Report § 5.5, Table I at 
http://uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2009/oai_05_wlt_01.html.  
93 See American Innovation at Risk: The Case for Patent Reform Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Inter-
net, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Jon W. Du-
das, Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office), available at http:// www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/testimon/110s/Dudas022708.doc (“The allowance 
rate for patents is currently 44%. This is in contrast to allowance rates in excess of 70% just eight years ago.”); 
Shine Tu, Stephen Maebius, and Jonathan W. Dudas, Squeezing More Patent Protection from a Smaller Budget 
Without Compromising Quality, 2 Landslide 37 (2009). 
  
      Dennis Crouch 19 
 
tions is clearly lower as well.94 That sentiment is reflected in John Welch’s description of 
administrative trademark appeals: “In the great majority of the trade dress cases decided by 
the [Trademark Trial and Appeal] Board since 2000, the applicant has failed to complete the 
course.”95 This difference between design patent prosecution and trade dress registration is 
especially apparent when considering that design patents receive the least scrutiny of any type 
of patent application examined on the patent-side of the USPTO while their parallel – prod-
uct configuration trade dress registrations – receive the most scrutiny of any type of trade-
mark registration application filed on the trademark-side of the USPTO.96 
The high-allowance rate appears to be primarily triggered by the USPTO’s sub silento abdica-
tion of its gatekeeper function in the realm of design patents. Before arriving at this conclu-
sion, I combed through over one thousand file histories of randomly selected design patents 
that issued in 2009.  Of those, only five had been rejected on novelty grounds and eight on 
obviousness grounds.  This calculates to a prior-art-based rejection rate of only 1.2%.97 The 
vast majority of the patents in my sample (81.6%) were never rejected during prosecution 
but rather received a notice of allowance in the USPTO’s first substantive response to the 
application filing.  The most common rejections were based on the doctrines of enablement, 
written description, and indefiniteness.98  These rejections – typically asserted collectively – 
were often overcome by a patentee’s ministerial clarification of aspects of the originally 
submitted drawings.  For well drafted design patent applications, the prosecution process is 
largely defined by the length of the examiner’s queue of pending cases.  Again, this results 
contrasts with the ordinary course for utility patent applications – the vast majority of which 
are initially rejected based on prior art grounds.99   
                                                 
94 John Welch, Trade Dress and the TTAB: If Functionality Don't Get You, Nondistinctiveness Will, 18 Allen's Trade-
mark Digest 5 (November 2004) at http:// ll-a.com/welch/tradeDressTTABOCT2004.pdf.  
95 Id.  
96 Helen Hill Minsker, Navigating Trademark Practice before the PTO: Ex Parte Appeals, 855 PLI/PAT 283 (2006) 
(“Assume that any non-traditional trademark [such as product configuration] automatically will face a higher 
standard of scrutiny, and prepare your evidentiary record accordingly.”). 
97 95% CI range of 0.7% – 2.1% based on an assumed Poisson distribution of the mean.  
98 35 U.S.C. 112, paragraphs 1 and 2. 
99 Lemley and Sampat, Examining Patent Examination, 2010 Stanford Tech. L. Rev. 2 (reporting that 85% of a 
sample of 10,000 utility patent applications had been initially rejected). 
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Chart 2 shows the distribution of design patent rejections based on the results of this 
study.100  
 
4.  Rapid Issuance of Design Patent Applications 
Coupled with the high allowance rate of design patents is the reality that design patent pros-
ecution is relatively rapid. Over the past decade, in particular, the prosecution timeline has 
been dramatically reduced from an average pendency of over two years in the 1980’s to less 
than 15 months for patents of more recent vintage.101  More than 45% of design patents is-
sued in 2009 had a pendency of less than one year.  One way that the Patent Office has con-
trolled pendency is by reducing outliers – those patents with exceedingly long pendency. The 
effect of this change is revealed in a dramatic decrease in the standard deviation of the pen-
                                                 
100 [Note: This chart will be re-worked for publication] 
101 These figures are based on the year of issuance. I.e, design patents issued in 2001 had an average pendency 
of less than 15 months. This data was obtained by comparing the issue date with the filing date for all issued 
design patents during the stated period.  The large amount of data allows us to easily reject the null hypothesis 
that the means time in prosecution did not vary in the two samples at a 99% CI.   
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dency time. In particular, the standard deviation of the of the pendency time that had steady 
at around 30 months during the 1980’s and 1990’s dropped to below 8 months during the 
past seven or so years (January 1, 2000 – May 1, 2008). Chart 3 shows the average pendency 
of design patent applications grouped by month of issuance through January 2010.102  The 
pendency distribution may be better described in Chart 4. 
 
 
                                                 
102 [NOTE: I WILL BE ABLE TO UPDATE THIS JUST BEFORE PUBLICATION.] 
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Despite the already rapid prosecution timeline, the USPTO has created two additional me-
chanisms for a design patent applicant to request that the Office speed its examination 
process.  Both avenues serve the same purpose and their descriptive names are almost con-
fusingly similar.  The first avenue is termed expedited examination and the second is termed 
accelerated examination.  The more popular of these processes, expedited examination, has offi-
cially been nicknamed the “rocket docket”103 and is only available for design patent appli-
cants.  Accelerated examination is available to utility patent applicants as well, but is less 
popular – presumably because of the set of additional burdens placed on applicants who 
wish to take part in the accelerated examination process.  In addition to the two avenues 
open to all applicants, the PTO will also speed examination of certain applications after 
granting a “petition to make special.”104  Most notable of the “make special” categories is for 
the applicant’s age or health.  
                                                 
103 M.P.E.P. § 501. 
104 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.102 and MPEP 708.02; Robert S. Katz, Examination of Design Patents in the United States, 10 
U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 109, 116 (2002). 
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For design patents, the rocket docket has become popular because it does not require any 
particular statements or additional burdens beyond the payment of a fee and “a pre-
examination search” of prior art.105  According to USPTO statistics, in 2007, 478 design pa-
tents issued through the rocket docket program.  Amongst those, the average pendency was 
approximately 9.2 months.106  For narrowly drafted designs that issued without rejection 
from the PTO, the average pendency on the rocket docket was 8.0 months.107   
Timing of Filing: In addition to short pendency, it is also important to consider timing of the 
actual application filing. With little exception, design patent applications are kept in confi-
dence by the USPTO until their issuance.108  This allows a manufacturer to file for design 
patent protection as early as the market-design is known with the hope that prosecution will 
be substantially complete by the product release.  That result contrasts with product-design 
trade dress rights that cannot be established until the product is already in the hands of con-
sumers.  
C. Design Patents and the Overlap of Trade Dress Rights 
This section does not provide comprehensive empirical results, but rather focuses on the 
phenomenon of patentees simultaneously claiming both design patent and trade dress rights.  
This layered approach was taken by Apple with its famous iPod Nano design. The iPod Na-
no design patent application was filed first, in August 2005, a few weeks before its Septem-
ber 2005 public release date.109 The subsequent trademark design registration application ap-
pears identical to the patented design.110  The trademark registration application was filed in 
                                                 
105 37 C.F.R. § 1.155.  
106 Robert M. Spear, “Get Your Design Patent Fast! Accelerated Examination And Expedited Examination” 
presented at USPTO Design Day 2008. 
http://www.aipla.org/Content/Microsites150/Industrial_Designs/Industrial_Designs_Articles_and_Presentat
ions/Design_Day_2008/Design_Day_2008_AcceleratedandExpeditedExamination-RobSpear.pdf. 
107 Id.  See Perry Saidman, The Crisis in the Law of Designs, 89 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 301, 320 (2007) 
(describing a successful three-month rocket-docket process).  Hugh Hansen (Moderator), Glenn Mitchell, Inna 
Fayenson, Perry Saidman (Panelists), 2001 Panel Discussion on Current Issues in Trademark Law-I'll See Your Two 
Pesos and Raise You . . . Two Pesos, Wal-Mart . . . and TrafFix: Where Is U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Heading, and 
How Will It Affect Trademark Practitioners?, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 509 (2001) ("It is possible 
to get design patents very, very quickly."). 
108 35 U.S.C. § 122(a), 122(b)(2)(iv) (design patent applications are kept in confidence and are not published). 
109 US Design Patent No. D 549,237.  
110 Trademark Registration No. 3365816. 
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July 2006 and received a registration certificate in January 2008 after Apple presented sub-
stantial evidence of acquired distinctiveness.111  
The pre-release design patent application filing allowed Apple to make an early claim for 
rights without publicly releasing any information regarding the design. The later-filed trade-
mark claim offers an additional layer of protection with a potentially longer duration.  
In litigation, it common for patentees to simultaneously assert design patent and trade dress 
rights.112  In a recent case involving Mary Jane style shoes,113 for instance, Sketchers sued 
Renaissance Imports and several John Doe importers for infringement of its design patent 
covering the shoe design114 as well as for interference with Sketchers’ unregistered trade 
dress in a way that would “cause confusion, mistake and deception among the general pur-
chasing public and interfere with Sketchers’ ability to use its … trade dress to indicate a sin-
gle quality controlled source of goods and services.”115 In addition, Sketchers asserted trade 
dress dilution116 and unfair competition.117 In response, Renaissance suggested that it was 
legitimately competing. As is typical, this case quickly settled.118  
A review of twenty-seven recent lawsuits involving assertion of both design patent and trade 
dress rights reveals that Sketcher’s approach of suing on unregistered trade dress rights is the 
more typical approach. In particular, none of the twenty-seven cases reviewed asserted “reg-
istered” trade dress rights but instead each claimed only unregistered trade dress.119  
                                                 
111 Id.  
112 See Appendix I for a non-exhaustive list of recently filed lawsuits where the plaintiff asserted both design 
patent and trade dress rights against a defendant’s use of a device.  
113 Mary Jane shoes are named after the comic strip character Buster Brown’s sister Mary Jane. In the early 20th 
century comic strip, she wore the shoes. Fashion 101: the quiz The News & Observer (Raleigh, North Carolina) 
May 19, 2008. 
114 U.S. Design Patent No. D. 547,935 issued on August 7, 2007 claiming the “ornamental design for a shoe 
upper as shown and described.” 
115 Sketchers U.S.A., Inc., v. Renaissance Imports, Inc., 07-cv-07341 (C.D.Cal. 2007) (claiming rights under Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). 
116 U.S.C. § 1125(c) and Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14330. 
117 Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200. 
118 In a filing 155 days after the original complaint was filed, the parties stipulated to a consent judgment under 
which the defendant agreed to stop selling a particular model of shoes that had been accused of infringement. 
http://docs.lexmachina.stanford.edu/cases/21935/documents/228022.pdf 
119 See Appendix I.B (listing cases). See also Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (explain-
ing protection of unregistered trade dress).  
  
      Dennis Crouch 25 
 
These results suggest that businesses and practicing lawyers are regularly considering design 
patents and trade dress rights as overlapping tools. Part III of this article takes that reality as 
a starting point and considers whether the policies that justify trade dress rights might also 
be useful in shaping design patent policy.  
Copying: Although I only used a small sample size, a similar review of thirty fivefiled design 
patent complaints shows that the vast majority of design patent litigations involve a manu-
facturer-plaintiff suing the maker of a competing version of a product.120  This results con-
trasts with the conventional wisdom for utility patents that most infringers are mens rea “in-
nocent.”121  That design patent plaintiffs are usually manufacturers working to protect mar-
ket-share is important for design patent policy because it suggests that contentious contro-
versies involving non-practicing patent holders in the utility patent sphere are not a major 
concern with regard to design patents.  
III.  JUSTIFYING A POLICY OF DESIGN PATENT RIGHTS 
A.  Trademark Function of Design Patent Protection 
This section begins with an introductory discussion of trademark theory and the practical 
limits of trade dress law. It then moves to a discussion of the modern role of design patent 
as driven by trademark theory in filling gaps in trade dress protection.  
1.  Background of Trademark Theory 
Trademark law is commonly premised on a theory of consumer protection.122 Trademarks 
help consumers avoid confusion in the market place and – in turn – lower search costs and 
                                                 
120 Although not required to state a cause of action for design patent infringement, over 77% of the complai-
nants in my sample self-identified as the manufacturer of a product covered by the asserted design patent and 
also asserted that the infringement was “willful.” Slightly less than half specifically accused the defendant of 
copying or creating a knock-off product.  Since an allegation of copying is not required to state a cause of ac-
tion, its absence from the complaint does not necessarily indicate anything. For a sampling of cases claiming 
copying, see, Nufix, Inc. v. Bacterin Int'l., Inc., 09-CV-93 (N.D. Ala.); Shop*TV, Inc. v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., , 
(D.Co); Oakley, Inc. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 09-cv-33 (C.D. Cal.); Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. Bon-Ton-Stores, Inc., 08-
CV-8074 (C.D. Cal.). See also Bruce A. Kugler & Craig W. Mueller, A Fresh Perspective on Design Patents, Colorado 
Lawyer (2009) (“Design patents are cost-effective deterrents to protect against direct knockoffs.”). 
121 Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1423 (2009). 
122 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. & Econ. 265 
(1987); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 
Trademark Rep. 1223 (2007); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367, 417 (1999); but 
see Mark McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame Law Review 1839 
(2007)(“Trademark law was not traditionally intended to protect consumers. Instead, trademark law, like all 
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avoid unwanted transactions.123 These tendencies have the “corollary effect of preventing 
the appropriation of a producer’s goodwill.”124  Consumers rely on trademarks as “short-
hand” indicators of intrinsic qualities and the origin of goods.125 Although this overall 
trademark benefit is seen generally by consumers, the trademark right is actually given to the 
producer to manage as a private right.  And, as private rights, trademarks have been a boon 
for producers.  Despite this positive story, trademark laws – especially more recent expan-
sions of trademark doctrines – have been criticized (1) as entrenchment of major right-
holders and (2) because of the potential and growing disconnect between the interests of the 
right holder and the interests of consumers generally.126 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that trademark protection is available for the design 
of a product if the design has acquired secondary meaning in the eyes of consumers “which 
serves to identify the product with its manufacturer or source.”127 Trademark rights protect-
ing the visual appearance of a product or its packaging are typically referred to as trade dress 
rights.  Once established, the trade dress right-holder may prevent unauthorized uses that 
are “likely to cause confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the goods. In 
these respects protection for trade dress exists to promote competition.”128 
2.  Limits of Trade Dress Law 
There are a number of legal limits on trademark and trade dress protection. Here, I focus on 
two specific limitations – proof of acquired distinctiveness and non-functionality.  These 
                                                                                                                                                 
unfair competition law, sought to protect producers from illegitimate diversions of their trade by competi-
tors.”). 
123  See note 122, supra.  
124 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 Trade-
mark Rep. 1223 (2007); See Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1985) (noting that 
the goal of trademark protection is to protect the consumer’s ability “to distinguish among competing produc-
ers”); Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the central concern of trademark law is 
to provide consumers with “a concise and unequivocal identifier of the particular source of particular goods”). 
125 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 Trade-
mark Rep. 1223 (2007). 
126 Id. Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 Stanford L. Rev. 413 (2010) (noting the unwar-
ranted expansion of trademark doctrines). 
127 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(product design and thus not protectable with trade dress rights without evidence of secondary meaning). 
128 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
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two limitations are important because they lead to major gaps in potential rights – gaps that I 
argue are largely filled by design patents.  
In Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Brothers, the Supreme Court held that unregistered trade dress 
deemed to be product configuration must first acquire distinctiveness to be protectable un-
der the Lanham Act, whereas trade dress deemed to be product packaging may be found 
“inherently distinctive.”129 The Wal-Mart court based its decision on the alignment of three 
factors: (1) a perceived unlikely prospect that a product’s design would acquire distinctive-
ness; (2) the potential harm of chilling competition through trademark litigation – even if 
unsuccessful; and (3) the availability of alternative forms of protection for the product confi-
guration such as design patent or copyright.130   
As a result of Wal-Mart, the USPTO began to require evidence of acquired distinctiveness 
before registering any product configuration trade dress on the Principle Register.131  Typi-
cally the USPTO will find acquired distinctiveness of a product configuration based on at 
least five years of continuous and exclusive use of the mark or actual evidence of acquired 
distinctiveness.132  Under this rubric, the delayed process of registering trade dress rights 
serves as an example of an additional practical limitation of trade dress rights. Certainly, 
trade dress rights may be enforced without federal registration under both the Lanham Act 
and State Law.133  However, unregistered rights are still contingent upon proof that the trade 
dress has obtained secondary meaning.134 Unregistered rights additionally lack the adminis-
                                                 
129 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Jeffrey M. Samuels and Linda B. Samuels, Trade 
Dress Undressed: Wal-Mart v. Samara, 29 AIPLA Quarterly Journal 43 (2001). 
130 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (“[T]he producer can ordinarily obtain protection 
for a design that is inherently source identifying (if any such exists), but that does not yet have secondary mean-
ing, by securing a design patent or a copyright for the design--as, indeed, respondent did for certain elements of 
the designs in this case.). 
131 Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) Section 1202.02(b). 
132 TMEP § 1212. See Feisthamel, Kelly, and Sistek, Trade Dress 101: Best Practices for the Registration of 
Product Configuration Trade Dress with the USPTO, 95 Trademark Reporter 1374 (November-December 
2005) at  http://home.comcast.net/~jlw28129/TradeDress101.pdf; John Welch, Trade Dress and the TTAB: If 
Functionality Don't Get You, Nondistinctiveness Will, 18 Allen's Trademark Digest 5 (November 2004) at 
http://www.ll-a.com/welch/tradeDressTTABOCT2004.pdf. 
133 Gray v. Meijer, Inc., 295 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 2002) ("The Lanham Act's protection of registered trademarks also 
extends to unregistered trade dress.").  
134 Gray v. Meijer, Inc., 295 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 2002) (“To recover for trade dress infringement under § 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that its 
trade dress has obtained “secondary meaning” in the marketplace; (2) that the trade dress of the two competing 
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trative imprimatur tied to registration135 or the incontestability status of long-term registered 
marks.136   
Trade dress protection is also unavailable for product features that are “functional.”137  For 
many years, the functionality test looked primarily to competitive needs – i.e, whether ex-
cluding others “from using this trade dress will hinder competition or impinge upon the 
rights of others to compete effectively[.]”138  In the 1982 Morton-Norwich case, the CCPA 
created four factors to help determine whether the trade dress was impermissibly functional. 
These factors include “(1) the existence of a utility patent that discloses the utilitarian advan-
tages of the design sought to be registered; (2) advertising by the applicant that touts the uti-
litarian advantages of the design; (3) facts pertaining to the availability of alternative designs; 
and (4) facts pertaining to whether the design results from a comparatively simple or inex-
pensive method of manufacture.”139  Later, in the 2001 TrafFix case, the Supreme Court 
added a wrinkle to the analysis of improper functionality– holding that a design will also be 
considered improperly functional for trade dress protection if “it is essential to the use or 
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”140 A product configu-
ration will be found functional and not eligible for trade dress protection of it satisfies either 
the Morton-Norwich or the TrafFix test.141 
The purposes of the trade dress functionality limitation also sound in competition and the 
“very serious” consequences of a perpetual monopoly.    
                                                                                                                                                 
products is confusingly similar; and (3) that the appropriated features of the trade dress are primarily nonfunc-
tional.”). 
135 Llewellyn Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and the Disparaging: Section 2(a) Trademark Law 
After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 187, 247 (2005) ("The USPTO rejects the contention that 
by registering a mark, it is granting the U.S. government's imprimatur to either the mark or the quality of the 
goods or services associated with that mark.  Nonetheless, granting a mark registration is not the same a bar-
ring a mark from registration."); Overview of Basic Principles of Trademark Law and Unfair Competition, 973 
PLI/Pat 49, 53 (2009). 
136 15 U.S.C § 1065.  
137 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). Of note, in TrafFix, Chief Justice Ro-
berts, then a private attorney, represented the successful petitioner. 
138 In re Morton-Norwich Prods, Inc., 213 USPQ 9 (CCPA 1982). 
139 Id.  
140 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 
456 U.S. 844, 851 n.10, 102 S. Ct. 2182, 72 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1982) ("In general terms, a product feature is func-
tional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.").  
141 See Valu Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 61 USPQ2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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Were the law otherwise, it would be possible for a manufacturer or dealer, who 
is unable to secure a patent on his product or on his design, to obtain a mono-
poly on an unpatentable device by registering it as a trade-mark. The potential 
consequences to the public might be very serious, because while a patent is is-
sued for only a limited term, a trade-mark becomes the permanent property of 
its owner and secures for him a monopoly in perpetuity.142 
In analyzing the results of both Wal-Mart and TrafFix on trade dress registration, noted 
trademark law commentator John Welch found that the hurdles were insurmountable for 
many hopeful trade dress registration applicants.143 Welch writes that “[i]n the great majority 
of the trade dress cases decided by the Board since 2000, the applicant has failed to com-
plete the course.”144 
This sentiment has been confirmed by noted design-rights proponent Perry Saidman in his 
2007 article declaring a "crisis in the law of designs."145 Lower courts have also been wary of 
extending trademark protection to product design.146   
Using these limits of trademark protection as a jumping-off point, the next section considers 
how design patent rights work to fulfill trademark goals – especially in areas where trade 
dress law is limited.  
3.  Design Patents as an Alternative Rule of Evidence for Trade Dress  
Design patent rights regularly overlap with trade dress rights.147  It makes sense then that the 
two regimes may also serve overlapping public purposes.148  Although design patent law 
                                                 
142 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).  
143 John Welch, Trade Dress and the TTAB: If Functionality Don't Get You, Nondistinctiveness Will, 18 Allen's Trade-
mark Digest 5 (November 2004) at http://www.ll-a.com/welch/tradeDressTTABOCT2004.pdf (.  
144 Id. 
145 Saidman, The Crisis in the Law of Designs, 89 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 301 (2007) (“Trade dress law, a 
branch of traditional trademark law, was not always un-friendly to product designs. . . . However, the two Su-
preme Court decisions in Wal-Mart and TrafFix changed the landscape significantly, to the point where only 
the rare design will qualify for trade dress protection.”). 
146 See, for example, Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 377 (2d Cir. 1997) (courts 
should exercise “particular caution”); Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32-34 (2d Cir. 
1995) (same);  
147 See notes accompanying Section II.C, supra.  
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does not require the condition precedent of trademark distinctiveness in the minds of con-
sumers before granting rights, the regime does require the patented design to be distinctive 
from the prior art.149  Similarly, while trademark law directly protects against customer con-
fusion between products on the market, design patent infringement considers the potential 
for confusion "in the eye of an ordinary observer" between the patented design and the ac-
cused design.150  The minute distinction between design patent distinctiveness and trade 
dress distinctiveness may be that “a trademark functions to indicate the source of goods” 
while a design patent focuses on the appearance of goods themselves.151 These two forms of 
distinctiveness are, of course, largely overlapping. It would seem almost unworkable to truly 
separate the two.152 
                                                                                                                                                 
148 Many commentators have recognized that the regimes overlap. However, few have recognized that the pur-
poses may overlap.  See, for example, Moshe H. Bonder, Patent & Lanham Acts: Serving Two Legitimate Purposes or 
Providing an Indefinite Monopoly?, 15 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 1, 7-8 (2004). 
149 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103(a).  
150 Michael S. Perez, Reconciling the Patent Act and the Lanham Act: Should Product Configurations Be Entitled to Trade 
Dress Protection After the Expiration of a Utility or Design Patent?, 4 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 383, 392 (1996) (distin-
guishing between trademark and design patent infringement doctrines); but see, A Review of Recent Decisions of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 58 Am. U.L. Rev. 747, 755 (2009) ("The 'ordinary observer' 
test thus establishes a standard for design patent infringement similar to the 'likelihood of confusion' standard 
for trademark-infringement cases.") and Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 785 F.2d 1026, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(holding district court references to "likelihood of confusion" in design patent infringement analysis to be 
harmless error). 
151 In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1053 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concurring “Moreover, the existence of 
copyright or patent protection in a product design does not insure the acquisition of any trademark rights. Only 
public reaction to one's actual use of the design can lead to protection as a trademark, a factual question that 
remains despite the right to keep others from using one's design which may be granted under the copyright or 
patent statutes.”) 
152 In a 1986 case, the Federal Circuit distinguished the two, but only on narrow grounds. Unette Corp. v. Unit 
Pack Co., 785 F.2d 1026, 1029, (Fed. Cir. 1986)(“ A determination that the shape of the alleged infringing con-
centrate package is not visible to the consumer at the time of sale and, therefore, the consumer is unlikely to be 
confused by the similarity in a competitor's product is inapposite. Concluding that a purchaser is unlikely to be 
confused by any similarity in a competitor's product only serves to blur the otherwise clear line that exists be-
tween the test for infringement of a design patent and the "likelihood of confusion" test for infringement of a 
trademark.”). Dominick & Hall v. R. Wallace & Sons Mfg. (design patent infringement “aggravated” by the fact 
that the infringing spoon-maker used lower quality silver plating rather than sterling silver.). Debra D. Peter-
son, Seizing Infringing Imports of Cinderella’s Slippers: How Egyptian Goddess Supports U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s 
Enforcement of Design Patents, 90 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y.  888, 890 (2008) (Noting that the similarity in 
the infringement analysis between design patents and trademarks suggests that customs officials should be 
granted authority to enforce design patents without an order from the International Trade Commission (ITC)). 
A more substantial difference between the two infringement doctrines involves the ordinary trademark limita-
tions that require confusion in a similar market area. Design patents can be bought and sold on their own, and 
infringement is not limited by law to a particular market area – in fact, the patent may be enforced even if the 
patentee is a ‘non-practicing entity’ without any product line at all.  However, with the expansion of the doc-
trine of trademark dilution, this distinction is also blurred. 
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I argue that these close similarities allow design patents to serve as proxies for trade dress 
rights – although provable through an alternative rule of evidence.153  In the same way that 
circumstantial evidence can be used to as a proxy of an ultimate fact in question, design pa-
tents can serve as a proxy for achieving the consumer protection goals of trademark law.  
The alternate approach offered by design patent protection has a pattern of focusing on 
qualities of the claimed design that may often be simpler than the trademark focus of at-
tempting to understand consumer-associations with the design.  The design patent distinc-
tiveness measures of novelty and nonobviousness are also ascertainable ex ante (even before 
any product reaches the hands of a consumer) as opposed to the ex post creation of trade 
dress rights.154  In this sense, design patents could be seen as filling the position of inherently 
distinctive trade dress that was eliminated in Wal-Mart.155  Using proxies are not unique in 
the law.  In fact, trade dress law already provides several proxies that serve as circumstantial 
evidence of distinctiveness.  Factors often applied include the length of time that the trade 
dress has been in use, sales revenue, advertising expenditures, and similarity of design.156  
Assuming that remedies are not cumulative, the more important trademark-like function of 
design patents is realized when traditional trade dress protection is unavailable, uncertain, or 
unduly expensive to pursue. Even in the ordinary case, the additional layer of protection 
provides greater certainty of rights and may lead to greater investment in the source-
identifying function of the design.  The trade dress limits of functionality and distinctiveness 
help identify particular situations where trade dress rights are unlikely to be available.  In 
those cases, design patents serve the role of a gap-filler by providing rights that might not 
have otherwise been available. Under the umbrella of the mechanism that I term doctrinal 
                                                 
153 See generally Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 Duke L. J. 683 (2003) (discussing copyright 
law as serving as a proxy for social goals).  
154 In the US, novelty and nonobviousness are judged as of the time of the invention. See, for example, 35 
U.S.C. § 103(a) (asking whether the invention “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made”).  
See Swift v. Dey, 4 Robertson, 611 (N.Y. Superior Ct. 1865) (distinguishing between design patent infringement 
based on "imitating the design" and trade-mark infringement based on "passing off"). 
155 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
156  Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce: Move Over Inherently Distinctive Trademarks -- The E-
Brand, I-Brand and Generic Domain Names Ascending to Power?, 50 Am. U.L. Rev. 937, 954, 954 n.113 (2001) ("mar-
keting, sales, usage, and passage of time"). See also, Suman Naresh, Incontestability and Rights in Descriptive 
Trademarks, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 953, 991 (1986) (suggesting that "incontestability is simply a new statutory me-
thod of proving distinctiveness in certain specified circumstances"); In re Pacer Technology, 338 F.3d 1348 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (similarity to other designs).  
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bootstrapping, design patents can have a synergistic effect on parallel trade dress rights and 
actually operate to reinforce and extend those rights.  In the doctrinal bootstrapping scena-
rio, design patent rights could be identified as a procedural pathway to eventually achieving 
trade dress rights.  
It is proper to pause here to consider (or even balk at) the notion that design patent rights 
can serve a trademark purpose when the design lacks distinctiveness, the sine qua non of 
trademark law.  However, that caution is not entirely applicable. Design patent law does not 
reject the notion of distinctiveness but rather uses a proxy to reach a conclusion that roughly 
approximates trademark distinctiveness. Patented designs may well have acquired secondary 
meaning in the eyes of consumers, but the proof of such distinctiveness may be delayed, un-
reliable, or expensive.  Newly created designs may not yet exhibit secondary meaning. How-
ever, early design patent protection may still be justified as part of the pathway to establish-
ing rights so long as the grant does not create problems of over-privatization.  
4.  Limits on Design Patent Rights Protect Against Monopoly Problems 
It would not make sense to simply run roughshod over the legal limitations of distinctive-
ness and nonfunctionality as they are found in trade dress law. Those limitations have the 
pro-competitive justification of avoiding over-privatization of functional design rights.157  
Such over-privatization has been identified with monopoly-type commercial problems and 
with a potential chilling effect on follow-on innovation and speech.158  Of course, design pa-
tent doctrine does not ignore these legitimate concerns.  Rather, the design patent laws in-
clude particular safeguards directed toward ensuring that the public is not unduly limited in 
its access to functional articles. For the gap-filling theory to work well, it is important that 
the design patent law safeguards be different from the trade dress safeguards. In that way, 
gaps in trade dress law can be filled by design patent protections and vice-versa.  
                                                 
157 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164-165 (1995) (“The functionality doctrine prevents 
trademark law . . . [from] inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product 
feature. . . . If a product’s functional features could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly over such 
features could be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forever.”); 
Traffix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Promo-
tional Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An Economic Model of Trademarks., 63 Tex. L. Rev. 639 (1984) (“the [non-
functionality] doctrine rests on the judgment that the benefits of preventing monopoly power in the produc-
tion of useful goods outweigh the increased search costs caused by duplication of features that have secondary 
meaning”). 
158 See generally articles cited in note 29. 
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a)  Distinctive from the Prior Art 
In design patent law, the distinctiveness question focuses on a comparison with the prior 
state-of-the-art (“prior art”).159 Design patents must be distinctive from the prior art and 
cannot be taken from the public domain.  Along this line, an application for patent must be 
made within a limited amount of time from the first public use or disclosure.  These limita-
tions are not found in trade dress law. Thus, in 2004, Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co. finally regis-
tered its “S-shaped” cookie design – more than forty-five years after initially selling the coo-
kie in commerce.160  In this way, the distinctiveness limitation of design patents operates to 
limit anti-competitive rights to after-arising product lines in a manner orthogonal to the si-
milarly purposed distinctiveness limits of trade dress law.  In the case of Stella D’Oro Bis-
cuits, trade dress protection was available even though the shape certainly lacked design pa-
tent distinctiveness. In other situations, a design may satisfy the design patent distinctiveness 
requirements but lack distinctiveness in the eyes of consumers.161 
b)  Design Patent Functionality Doctrine 
Rather than being orthogonal, the functionality limits of design patent and trade dress ap-
pear concentric.  Virtually without exception, the functionality limitation of design patent 
doctrine is substantially attenuated as compared with its trade-dress parallel:  
[A]lthough the general considerations of functionality are of course similar, the 
functionality doctrine in trademark law is quite distinct from the functionality 
determination in design patents. Although functionality will invalidate a design 
patent only when the design is dictated by the function, a lesser showing of 
functionality is necessary to invalidate trademarks. Functionality will invalidate 
a trademark if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects 
the cost or quality of the article.162 
A 1996 Federal Circuit case is useful for illustrating how functionality can occasionally limit 
the potential coverage of a design patent.163 In Best Lock, the appellate court was asked to 
                                                 
159 Design patent doctrine does not ordinarily use “distinctive over the prior art” as a term of art. Here, I intend 
the term to mean that the claimed design is novel and nonobvious.  
160 See U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 2,904,812. 
161 The iPod Nano design discussed in Part II.C may be a case-in-point. The design patent was filed before the 
public release. At that point, Apple would not have been able to show acquired distinctiveness as required to 
register product design trade dress.  
162 Spotless Enters. v. A & E. Prods. Group, 294 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
163 Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Christopher J. Gaspar, The Federal Circuit 
Locks Down the Ornamentality Requirement: Best Lock v. Ilco Unican, 23 Iowa J. Corp. L. 179 (1997). 
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considered Best Lock’s replacement key design patent.164 Best Lock’s design patent claimed 
the shape of a key blade blank and helped the company control the aftermarket in replace-
ment keys. The diagrams in the asserted design patent – and thus the claims – cover the 
cross-sectional shape of the key blank including the keyway design that determines whether 
a particular key could fit in a corresponding lock.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit majority 
panel held that the key blade design was invalid because it was dictated by function.  In par-
ticular, the court noted that the patented keyway shape was the only shape that would fit the 
corresponding lock sold by the patentee. “An attempt to create a key blade with a different 
design would necessarily fail because no alternative blank key blade would fit the corres-
ponding lock.”165 Because the patented design shape was primarily functional, it was also 
invalid.166  Restating the rule of law in a later case, the Federal Circuit saw invalidating func-
tionality only when the claimed design is “the only possible form of the article that could 
perform its function.”167   
The Best Lock holding could be seen as a way of ensuring access to up-stream technologies – 
except for the fact that the corresponding lock had been designed contemporaneously with 
the key. Picking upon this issue, Judge Newman filed a dissenting opinion in which she ar-
gued that a patent covering an arbitrary design should not be invalid simply because it close-
ly “interacts with an article of complementary design.”168 “[T]he fact that the key blade is the 
mate of a keyway does not convert the arbitrary key profile into a primarily functional de-
sign.”169 
Although Judge Newman’s attempt to cabin in the functionality limitation holds theoretical 
promise, at the end of the day the court chose an alternative route.  Thus, the doctrinal law 
emerging from Best Lock is that the functionality doctrine blocks design patent protection 
                                                 
164 Best Lock had asserted U.S. Utility Patent No. 5,136,869 and Design Patent No. D. 327,636.  
165 Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  
166 Id.; Ryan Vacca, Design Patents: An Alternative When the Low Standards of Copyright Are Too High?, 31 S. Ill. U. 
L.J. 325, 348 (2007) (noting that the test here is similar to that of copyright). 
167 Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu-Kote Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999).   
168 Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(Newman, J. in dissent). Judge Pauline 
Newman – longtime patent director for FMC Corporation – is widely seen as one of the most pro-patent 
judges on the Federal Circuit.. See, John R. Allison and Mark Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent 
Validity Cases, 27 FLA ST. L. REV. 745 (2000).  
169 Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(Newman, J. in dissent).   
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where patent rights would block access to the only possible mechanism for performing a 
particular function.   
In design patent law, the non-functionality doctrine has been grounded in the ornamental 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 171.  From an historic perspective, it is interesting to note that 
the original 1842 design patent statute did not include the ornamental requirement. Rather, 
the statute called allowed a design patent for “any new and original design for a manufac-
ture.”170 The 1842 statute additionally provides for, inter alia, patents on designs for printing 
of fabrics; designs for busts and statues; and “impression[s].”  An 1870 change in the law 
added the confusing requirement that the designs for articles of manufacture also be “use-
ful.”171 Eventually, however, the courts settled on the conclusion that a useful design should 
be defined as an ornamental design.  Writing in 1914, Symons noted that “A majority of the 
courts which have decided what meaning should be given to this word ‘useful’ as used in the 
Act of 1870 . . .  have held that it referred to the usefulness resulting from creating an orna-
mental or beautiful thing.”172  In 1902, the word “useful” was eliminated from the statute 
and replaced with the current requirement that the design be “ornamental.”173 
c)  Explicit and Narrow Claim Scope  
Design patents are quite narrow in scope and cover only what is shown by the drawings in 
the patent.174  Any potential monopoly power given to the rights-holder has been characte-
rized as “very weak”175 A design’s attractiveness over other designs has historically been seen 
as “not a very important margin of advantage.”176 In addition, alternative designs are often 
quite easy to alter – especially when the operation involves modifying an existing popular 
design in a way that does not infringe.  As Judge Hand wrote in his 1940 Fashion Originators’ 
                                                 
170 5 Stat. 543 (1842). 
171 William L. Symons, The Law of Patents for Designs 18-20 (1914). 
172 Id. at 19. 
173 Id. at 13-14; Patent Act of May 1902, ch. 783, § 4929, 32 Stat. 193. 
174 In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1988) (“Design patents have almost no scope”); see also Elmer v. 
ICC Fabricating, 67 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed.Cir.1995); Karl G. Hanson, Intellectual Property Strategies for Protecting the 
Looks of a New Product, 81 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y. 887, 901 (1999) (“[E]ach solid line [in the drawings] 
can be another limitation that effectively narrows the scope of the claim.”). 
175 John H. Lewin, The Associated Press Decision – An extension of the Sherman Act, 13 U. Chi. L. Rev. 247, 262 n. 27 
(1945-1946) (discussing Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 114 F.2d 80 (2nd Cir. 1940), 
aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941));  
176 Id.   
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Guild opinion, “there are substitutes for most goods.”177  In addition to having a narrow 
scope, design patent rights are explicitly delineated in the publicly available patent document 
and the right-holder is typically easily identifiable via the USPTO assignment records. These 
limitations are absent in trade dress law -- especially that of unregistered trade dress -- be-
cause trade dress rights are traditionally created through use of a mark in commerce rather 
than explicitly delineating the scope of rights.178  
d)  The Self Annealing Nature of Design Patents 
The Coase Theorem suggests that, in a world without transaction costs, bargaining between 
interested parties will lead to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of prop-
erty rights.179  Traditionally, trademark rights have not been considered a property right.180 
Instead, trademarks were asserted as reactive torts in order to prevent unfair competition.  
Judge Winter briefly explained this distinction in the Second Circuit Coach Leatherware v. 
AnnTaylor case:  
Unlike a design patent or copyright owner, a trademark claimant does not have 
an exclusive right to a design; its right is solely in protecting its identity as the 
source of its product. Ann Taylor thus has every right to copy Coach's bags so 
long as consumers know they are buying Ann Taylor bags.181 
Because trademarks are not self-sustaining property rights, they cannot ordinarily be bought 
and sold apart from their associated goodwill.182 This traditional treatment of trademark 
rights has shifted toward a property theory.183 Yet, even proponents of the Coase Theorem 
dismiss its applicability to trademark law because of the complex transaction costs.184  As a 
                                                 
177 Fashion Originators’ Guild 114 F. 2d 80 (2nd Cir. 1940). 
178 Consider Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719 (2009). 
179 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960); F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, 
and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 Emory L.J. 
327 (2006). 
180 William H. Browne, A Treatise on the Law of Trade-Marks: and Analogous Subjects 524 (1873) (Naked 
transfer of trademark rights has long been called a “fraud upon the public.”). 
181 Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162 (2nd Cir. 1991).  
182 Id.  
183 Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687 (1999).  
184 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 275 
(1987) 
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well defined and easily transferrable right,185 design patents offer some hope of lowering 
these transaction costs especially when allocating rights as between creators (inventors) and 
manufacturers.186  Professor Reichman saw transaction-aiding mechanism as essentially the 
only function of design rights prior to 1975. “[D]esign patent law, while not inoperative, 
served ancillary commercial functions, such as establishing ownership, title and priority in 
order to facilitate transfers and to permit registration abroad.”187  Thus, for instance, a stand-
alone designer may create a design and apply for design patent rights without prior contract-
ing or even contacting potential manufacturing or “brand name” companies that could even-
tually deliver the product to market.  The patent right forms an easily transferable property 
interest to facilitate the movement of rights from the designer to the producer.188 Thus, the 
defined right allows Coasean bargaining to determine the best innovators and best managers 
of intellectual property rights.189 Trademark law does not offer this potential option because, 
inter alia, trademark does not reward innovation.   
Beyond the potentially reduced transaction costs, design patents offer a self-annealing poten-
tial based on their limited fourteen year term.190  This limited duration means that the admin-
istrative over-granting of rights is naturally self-correcting because the rights will eventually 
cease.  The fourteen year term is arguably too long of a time to wait for such a self-
correction since many designs will have a shorter market lifespan.  However, the fourteen 
year term may be seen as short when compared to rights in trademark (indefinite), trade se-
                                                 
185 35 U.S.C. § 261 ("patents . . . shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing."). 
186 Schrauder v. Beresford & Co., PTO Trademark Interference Case reprinted in William H. Browne, A treatise on 
the law of trade-marks: and analogous subjects 521 (1873) (available via Google Books) ("Another expressive evidence 
of [trade mark's] radical difference from even a design-patent is that, whereas in such patent the recipient must 
either be the designer, or hold by assignment from him, ownership in a trade-mark is created by simple adop-
tion and use,-- and in fact in the present case neither party claims to have taken any part in getting up the de-
sign."); Robert S. Katz, Design Patents in DRAFTING PATENTS FOR LITIGATION AND LICENSING 
563 (ABA, Bradley C. Wright ed. 2008) (“The more typical situation involves a manufacturing company hiring 
a design firm to help produce aesthetically pleasing industrial designs. In these situations, the manufacturer 
commonly requires assignment of all intellectual property created as part of the contractual relationship be-
tween the manufacturer and designer.”) 
187 J.H. Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of the Emerging Interim Mod-
els, 31 J. Copr. Soc’y 267, 276 (1983) (noting that between 1922 and 1974, “the Second Circuit upheld the valid-
ity of only two design patents”). 
188 See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 1742 
(2007). 
189 See, F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive 
Effects and Downstream Access, 56 Emory L.J. 327 (2006). 
190 35 U.S.C. § 173. 
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cret (indefinite), copyright (life of the author + seventy years), and utility patent (twenty 
years from filing). 
B.  Doctrinal Bootstrapping Role of Design Patents 
In the 1940 and 1950’s Honeywell designed its now ubiquitous round wall-attached ther-
mostat and obtained both a utility patent on the control mechanism191 and a design patent 
covering visible shape of the thermostat.192 After those patents expired and after some initial 
setbacks, Honeywell was able to convince the USPTO to register the shape as trade dress.193  
Although Honeywell’s competitor Emerson Electric initially objected the two reached a set-
tlement and the trade dress was eventually registered in 1990.194 
In this example, Honeywell leveraged its period of exclusivity guaranteed by design patent 
rights to facilitate registration of its trade dress.195  Following the process of doctrinal boot-
strapping, design patent rights do more than simply fill a gap in the trade dress protection 
regime.  Rather, design patents can play a synergistic role by extending the functional dura-
tion and quality of trade dress rights available.  In this section, I discuss three mechanisms of 
doctrinal bootstrapping.196   
1.  Using Design Patent Rights as Evidence of Non-Functionality 
The first form of doctrinal bootstrapping is based on what I term the “anti-TrafFix doc-
trine.”  In TrafFix, the Supreme Court held that the existence of a utility patent covering a 
particular design creates a presumption that the patented design is functional.197  Because 
design patents lack functionality, the anti-TrafFix doctrine would suggest that a prior design 
patent covering a design provides evidence that the design is non-functional.  
                                                 
191 U.S. Patent No. 2,394,920 issued February 12, 1946. 
192 U.S. Design Patent No. D176,657 issue Jan. 17, 1956.   
193 In re Honeywell Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1600, 1988 WL 252417 (T.T.A.B.1988). 
194 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1,622,108. 
195 See also Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd. v. Pacific Bay Intern., Inc., 461 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2006) ("As its utility and design 
patents began to expire, the company learned of a competitor using trademark law to protect its designs.").  
196 These mechanisms sit in some tension with cases involving overlapping intellectual property rights such as 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 
376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964), Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121-122 (1938), and Singer Mfg. 
Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).  These issues are discussed in Part IV. 
197 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
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The court in Keystone Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Jaccard Corp.198 has probably written the best description 
of an anti-TrafFix doctrine that allows design patent rights to serve as evidence supporting 
the non-functionality of asserted trade dress rights.199  Jaccard’s hand-held meat tenderizer is 
covered by an expired design patent – seemingly leaving an open avenue for direct copycat 
competition.  As part of a larger lawsuit, however, Jaccard asserted trade dress rights over 
the shape of the device.  In its decision, the district court agreed that trade dress rights may 
protect the subject matter of an expired design patent.200  The district court rejected the sug-
gestion that the design patent creates a presumption of non-functionality.  Instead, the court 
held that the design patent simply serves as another piece of evidence to be used by the jury 
in determining non-functionality.201   
The conclusions in Keystone are widely supported by case law.202  The leading cases are also 
clear, however, that – because of differences in the functionality limitations of the two doc-
trines – that the design patent cannot serve as conclusive proof of trademark nonfunctionali-
ty.203   
                                                 
198 2007 WL 655758 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). 
199 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001)(holding that the existence of a utility patent 
creates a presumption of design functionality).   
200 2007 WL 655758 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). 
201 Id.  
202 See, for example, Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd. v. Pacific Bay Intern., Inc., 461 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2006) (indicating that 
design patent creates a presumption of non-functionality); Levenger Co. v. Feldman, 516 F.Supp.2d 1272 (S.D.Fla. 
2007) (prior design patent can rebut a defense of improper functionality of trade dress); Aadventure Products, Inc. 
v. Simply Smashing, Inc., 2007 WL 2775128 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (“Although Plaintiff does not explicitly state that its 
claimed dress is nonfunctional, that fact can be implied by the existence of the design patents.”); Global Mfg. 
Group, LLC v. Gadget Universe.Com, 417 F.Supp.2d 1161 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (in case involving an assertion of unre-
gistered trade dress rights for an electric scooter, the court held that the plaintiff’s design patent covering the 
features of the scooter served as evidence of non-functionality); Krueger Int'l v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 
605, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1334 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Because a design patent is granted only for nonfunctional designs, 
it can serve as evidence that a plaintiff's trade dress is not functional.”); In re R. M. Smith, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 629 
(T.T.A.B. 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 1482, 222 U.S.P.Q. 1 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (the existence of a design patent, while 
some evidence of nonfunctionality, is not alone sufficient evidence); Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., 41 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1412, 1417 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (an expired design patent of plaintiff “is presumptive evidence of non-
functionality”); McCarthy on Trademarks § 7.93 (“A design patent, rather than detracting from a claim of non-
functional trade dress or trademark, may support such a claim.”) 
203 In re American National Can Co., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1841 (T.T.A.B. 1997); In re Caterpillar Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1335 
(T.T.A.B. 1997) (“The fact that a configuration design is the subject of a design patent, as in this case, does not, 
without more, establish that the design is nonutilitarian and serves as a trademark.”). 
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2.  Using Design Patent Exclusivity to Facilitate the Acquisition of Distinc-
tiveness 
A design patent alone does not prove secondary meaning.204 In fact, the design patent itself 
offers no direct evidence of secondary meaning.205  However, the significant period of exclu-
sivity offered by a design patents can aid in the process of developing a consumer associa-
tion between the design and its source.206  That association then serves as evidence to sup-
port trade dress rights.  This is the approach used by Honeywell and Apple, supra, and may 
be especially important for product designs that are likely to be copied quickly.207 
3.  Using Design Patent Rights to Substitute for Delay in Trade Dress Regis-
tration 
Although trade dress rights are potentially perpetual, their start-up is not instantaneous. Ra-
ther, the establishment of trade dress rights and their potential registration is a time consum-
ing process that could be derailed by intervening knock-off competitors.  Under certain cir-
cumstances, design patents can offer an earlier establishment of rights and in that way ex-
tend the overall duration rights by adding time at the front-end.  
C.  Design Patents As a Bulwark against Trademark Doctrinal Creep: 
Scholars have noted a dramatic expansion of both trademark and copyright doctrines.208 In 
the face of this expansion, even those whose political bent leans away from granting protec-
                                                 
204 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Interco Tire Corp., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1722 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (design patent on 
tire tred does not prove that the design has acquired secondary meaning). 
205 In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1053 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concurring “Moreover, the existence of 
copyright or patent protection in a product design does not insure the acquisition of any trademark rights. Only 
public reaction to one's actual use of the design can lead to protection as a trademark, a factual question that 
remains despite the right to keep others from using one's design which may be granted under the copyright or 
patent statutes.”) 
206 Juliea Matheson and Stephen Peterson, Combine and Conquer: How the Synthesis of Design Patent and Trade Dress 
Achieve Maximum Protection for Your Product Design (May 2009) available at 
http://finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=74f843be-c63a-40cc-8ae0-007bc50fdd99. 
207 One commentator labeled this reliance on design patents for a period exclusivity as “cheating the trademark 
system.” Daniel H. Brean, Enough is Enough: Time to Eliminate Design Patents and Rely on More Appropri-
ate Copyright and Trademark Protection for Product Designs, 16 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 325, 364 (2008).  As 
discussed in Part IV, it is unclear why a pejorative should be applied to this practice.  
208 Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687 (1999); Mark 
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame Law Review 1839 (2007).  Frank I. 
Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 60 Harvard L. Rev. 813 (1925) (“there is no part of the law 
which is more plastic than unfair competition”). 
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tions for functional designs may prefer design patents as a stable middle-ground with the 
substantive limitations discussed in Part III.A.4.  The idea here is that the existence of a 
strong design patent regime provides a bulwark against further expansion of other doctrines 
lest the “careful balance” of rights be upset.209  The concern is especially true for Lanham 
Act § 43(a) actions because the statute is so broadly written.  “Courts must proceed with 
caution in assessing claims to unregistered trademark protection in the design of products so 
as not to undermine the objectives of the patent laws.”210  In Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 
the Supreme Court rejected the notion that a product design may be inherently distinctive 
under the trademark laws and called upon the existence and availability of design patents as 
partial justification for limiting trade dress availability.211  In Bretford Mfg., the Seventh Circuit 
noted this same potential in finding that the impact of limitations on trade dress protection 
for product design are muted by the additional availability of design patent and copyright 
protection.212 In this way, even if design patent doctrine is not justified on any positive 
grounds, its existence serves an inverse role of cabining-in the potential growth of other doc-
trines. As a traditionally much narrower right, design patent law itself is likely less susceptible 
to expansion pressure.213 
D.  Rejecting the Incentive Model as the Primary Justification for Design Patents 
1.  Traditional Justification of Design Patents as Promoting Innovation 
In testifying in support of the Patent Act of 1902, the then Commissioner of Patents re-
ported a narrow gap-filling role for design patents – fitting tightly between utility patents and 
copyright law.214  The Commissioner noted that this narrow role was the only defined posi-
tion for design patent law and was its “proper philosophical position”: “If the design patent 
                                                 
209 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 168 (U.S. 1989). 
210 Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 978-979 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1987). 
211 Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). See also, I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 
50 (1st Cir. 1998) (reasoning that anti-dilution remedies for trade dress would award an enduring degree of 
protection that is specifically for design patents without forcing trademark owners to clear the hurdles required 
for patent protection). 
212 Bretford Mfg. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Corp., 419 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Bretford did not obtain patent or copy-
right protection, so it cannot block Smith System's copy-cat tables.”). 
213 See Jerome Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of the 
Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. Copr. Soc’y 267, 276 (1983);  
214 Quoted in Scientific American, Vol. 86, No. 21, p. 361. 
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does not occupy this position there is not other well-defined position for it to take.”215  The 
Commissioner’s position continues to hold sway even today.  Courts regularly refuse to con-
sider that the design patent regime may have any other purpose than the stated proposition 
of encouraging more designs.216  In the probably most on-point case of Mogen David Wine 
Corp., the appellate court again recognized that a design patent is something of a hybrid be-
tween the incentive schemes of utility patent and copyright law.217 “A design patent is a hy-
brid which combines in itself features of both a patent and a copyright.”218 Likewise, TRIPS 
indicates that industrial design protection may be captured by either design rights or copy-
rights, but leaves out the potential for trade dress protection.  These pronouncements about 
design patent law all share the common theme that design patent law is supposed to serve as 
a backstop to protect rights when the primary lines of protection – patent and copyright – 
fail.  More recent commentary on the purposes of design patent law has largely followed the 
same trend.219  
                                                 
215 Id. The 1902 amendment removed the word “useful” from the design patent requirements in an attempt to 
further separate design patent law from the space occupied by utility patent protection. As the Commissioner 
noted, design patent law “has been treated of late years as an annex to the statute covering mechanical cases, 
since the introduction of the word ‘useful’ into it. It is thought that this practice should no longer continue.” Id.  
When academics later re-traced the development of design patent law they found that the “fact that the law of 
design patents is following the precedent of mechanical patents rather than copyrights is an accident of admin-
istration. It is due to their name and to their subjection to the jurisdiction of the Patent Office.”  Kenneth B. 
Umbreit, Consideration of Copyright, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 932 (1938-1939); John Wolff, Copyright Law and Patent Law: 
A Comparison, 27 Iowa L. Rev. 250 (1941-1942) (“Design patents form a connecting link between the subject 
matter of ordinary (utility) patents and that of copyright.”). 
216 See In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ("Federal design patent laws were created to encour-
age the invention of ornamental designs. Federal trademark laws, which are independent in origin from the 
design patent laws, seek to prevent the public from encountering confusion, mistake, and deception in the pur-
chase of goods and services and to protect the integrity of the trademark owner's product identity."); Mazer v. 
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (U.S. 1954); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (design patents and 
trade dress protection could sequentially co-exist – because the two serve different purposes); Forestek Plating 
& Mfg. Co. v Knapp-Monarch Co. (1939, CA6 Ohio) 106 F2d 554, 43 USPQ 39; Robert W. Brown & Co. v 
De Bell (1957, CA9 Cal) 243 F2d 200, 113 USPQ 172; Hueter v Compco Corp. (1950, CA7 Ill) 179 F2d 416, 
84 USPQ 312 (Purpose of design patent law is to promote decorative arts and stimulate exercise of inventive 
faculty in improving appearance of articles of manufacture); Hadco Products, Inc. v Walter Kidde & Co. (1972, 
CA3 Pa) 462 F2d 1265, 174 USPQ 358, cert den (1972) 409 US 1023, 34 L Ed 2d 315, 93 S Ct 464, 175 USPQ 
678 (Purpose of design patent statute is to reward and thereby encourage creative artistic activity rather than 
mere changes of detail which may produce novelty but do not reflect invention, and while distinctions in detail 
may sustain design as novel, they lose significance in establishing nonobviousness.); Avia Group International, 
Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (''When function 
dictates a design, protection would not promote the decorative arts, a purpose of the design patent statute.''). 
217 In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
218 Id. 
219 Amir Khoury, Three-Dimensional Objects as Marks: Does a “Dark Shadow” Loom over Trademark 
Theory?, 26 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 335 (2008) (“design patents resemble copyrights because both are in-
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Underlying the institutions of U.S. utility patent and copyright law is the U.S. Constitution, 
which provides congress with the power: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”220  The theory explicit in the constitutional grant of 
authority is to provide an incentive structure offering temporary exclusive rights in exchange 
for new creations.221  Design patents arguably fill a gap because neither utility patents nor 
copyright protect ornamental designs inseparably incorporated into an article of manufac-
ture.222 
2.  Tentatively Rejecting the Incentive Justification for Design Patents 
Despite the intuitive appeal of the incentive justification, I tentatively reject the model as the 
primary justification for design patent doctrine.  The prospect of design patent rights almost 
certainly provides some incremental incentive to create new designs.  However, for the vast 
majority of cases, it is unlikely that this design-patent originated incentive is the driving-force 
behind new design innovations.  Because we lack genuine empirical support for these con-
clusions, I offer a framework for analyzing this issue and tentative conclusions based upon 
anecdotal understanding of these underlying inputs and a tentative conclusion.  
                                                                                                                                                 
tended to reward creativity and originality”); Article: Enough is Enough: Time to Eliminate Design Patents and 
Rely on More Appropriate Copyright and Trademark Protection for Product Designs, 16 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 
325 (2008); Design Protection - Time to Replace the Design Patent, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 942, 952-53 (1967); Mi-
chael Grynberg, Things Are Worse than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a "Formalist" Age, 24 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 897, 970 (2009) (criticizing the creation-incentive argument for trademarks and indicating that such 
incentives are more the concern of copyright or design patent law); Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Pa-
tent: Illusion or Reality?, 10 Okla. City L. Rev. 195 (1985); Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA 
L. Rev. 1341 (1987). 
220 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution. In the language of the courts, the potential 
rights “promote the decorative arts.” Avia Group International, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 
1563, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (''When function dictates a design, protection would not promote the 
decorative arts, a purpose of the design patent statute.''). See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent 
System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265 (1977); R. Merges and R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Co-
lumbia L.R. ___(1990).  Patents may have some limited value in the absence of a link to a current or potential 
commercial market.  Some inventors and companies may value the “resume effect” of holding a patent regard-
less of whether the patent actually covers anything relevant to a commercial market. In this sense, the patent 
may signal that the entity is especially innovative. See Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U Chi. L.R. ___ (2002). 
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (noting that copyright laws exist to 
promote the progress of the arts). 
221 See Peter Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
(Polinsky and Shavell, eds).  
222 Academics have argued that utility patents do create this type of incentive to commercialize. See, F. Scott 
Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science--A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 
95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 691, 695 (2001). 
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Three interrelated factors aid in the conclusion that design patents do not drive an incentive 
to innovate new designs. First, the business need and consumer demand for good design is 
so great that products and articles of manufacture will likely be well designed even without 
design patent protection – especially when the design investment is relatively small.223  
Second, typical design patents cover small advances in the art and require only relatively 
small investment.224  These small innovations needing only small investment are likely to oc-
cur even in the absence of protection.225  Finally, the narrow scope of protection offered by 
design patents means that truly groundbreaking or pioneering designs will be difficult to fully 
protect with design patents. Rather, design patents can almost always be designed around 
because the patent rights cannot fully capture the underlying functionality of a design. Fur-
ther, because design patent scope is tied to a specific embodiment of a specific article of 
manufacture, design patents are not useful to control the flow of design ideas as they are 
adapted for use in other markets.  Thus, the intuition here is that there is little need to pro-
vide exclusive rights to incentivize relatively small advances, and design patents are not 
broad enough to provide an incentive for more investment-intensive innovations. 
When the market already supplies the incentive for good design, further rights may disrupt 
an otherwise competitive market. This argument is presented by Professors Kal Raustiala 
                                                 
223 Kevin Lane Keller, Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Managing Customer-Based Brand Equity, 57 J. MAR-
KETING 1, 4 (1993)(placing product shape and other attributes as components of brand equity). Perry Said-
man, A Manifesto on Industrial Design Protection: Resurrecting the Design Registration League (Spring, 2007) at 
http://www.protectdesigns.org/images/Manifesto.pdf (although writing in favor of stronger design rights, 
Saidman notes the positive correlation between good product design and corporate profits); See also Julie H. 
Hertenstein et al., The Impact of Industrial Design Effectiveness on Corporate Financial Performance, 22 THE JOURNAL 
OF PRODUCT INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 3, (2005); Gerda Gemser & Mark A. A. M. Leenders, 
How integrating industrial design in the product development process impacts on company performance, 18 THE JOURNAL 
OF PRODUCT INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 28 (2001); Julie H. Hertenstein, Valuing design: Enhancing 
corporate performance through design effectiveness, 12 DESIGN MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 10 (2001). 
224 Although good design of consumer products typically requires highly skilled designers, design of the orna-
mental feature does not typically require the type of research investment necessary for many technological in-
novations. See Julie H. Hertenstein, Valuing design: Enhancing corporate performance through design effectiveness, 12 DE-
SIGN MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 10 (2001). 
225 Patenting Medical Procdures: A Search for a Compromise between Ethics and Economics, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1527 
(1997) (distinguishing between the incentives for high-development-cost and low-development-cost innova-
tions); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 467 (2008); 
Jared Earl Grusd, Internet Business Methods: What Role Does and Should Patent Law Play?, 4 Va. J.L. & Tech. 9 
(1999) (providing an example of one industry, Internet business methods, that does not need patents to create 
an incentive to innovate). 
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and Christopher Sprigman in their Virginia Law Review article on the “Patent Paradox.”226 
Raustiala and Sprigman examine the case study of high fashion design – an area traditionally 
difficult to protect with any traditional form of intellectual property. The pair concludes that 
the current fashion design industry appears already prosperous.227  The article admits that a 
lack of valuable rights results in massive knock-off producers and counterfeiting.  However, 
the article proposes that in some cases, the existence of knock-off producers creates a great-
er demand for the “real thing.”228  
IV.  THE PROBLEM OF OVERLAPPING RIGHTS 
Design patent litigation often includes allegations of utility patent infringement, copyright 
infringement, trade dress violations, and charges of unfair competition as well. Thus, the in-
troductory language of the following district court summary judgment order is not altogether 
uncommon: “On February 16, 2007, [the plaintiff] filed suit against defendants, asserting 
claims for copyright, trade dress, design patent, and trademark infringement, as well as 
claims for false designation of origin, unfair competition, and deceptive trade practices.”229 
There are extensive differences between each of these rights formulations.  However, the 
similarities and overlaps cannot go unnoticed.  For any given consumer device, the innova-
tive inner workings may be protected by one or more utility patents; the outward shape (or 
portion of the shape) that is recognizable to consumers protected by trade dress laws; a se-
parable portion of the shape may also fall under copyright protection; the exact manufactur-
ing and distribution process is no doubt a trade secret with outsourced manufacturers bound 
by contractual confidentiality and non-compete agreements. In some cases, consumers may 
                                                 
226 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 
92 Va. L. Rev. 1687, 1693, 1699 (2006); Should Fashion Design Be Copyrightable?, 6 Nw. J. Tech. , &, Intell. Prop. 
122 (2007) (arguing that US copyright law should be modified to accommodate fashion design). This same 
argument could be made for unlawful digital file sharing – that those unauthorized copies actually boost the 
lawful demand for the underlying content. 
227 Piracy Paradox, Supra Note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
228 Id.;  Orit Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 1105 (2008). 
229 Yurman Studio, Inc. v. Castaneda, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63158  (S.D.N.Y, August 19, 2008); 16 Tex. Intell. 
Prop. L.J. 325, 328 (“the federal trademark and copyright laws have since evolved to the point where they now 
cover essentially the same subject matter as design patents.”). 
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also be bound be point-of-purchase agreements not to reverse engineer the product, which 
may also include extra legal copy protections – such as “break if opened” seals.230 
In Part III.B, I discuss the concept of doctrinal bootstrapping in a positive light.  However, 
many legal academics have identified overlapping rights regimes as problematic.  For in-
stance, Michael Heller and others have suggested a potential anti-commons effect of “the 
proliferation of intellectual property rights.”231 In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has 
                                                 
230 Important articles discussing the interplay between the various rights regimes: Jane Ginsburg, Of Mutant 
Copyrights, Mangled Trademarks, and Barbie’s Beneficence: The Influence of Copyright on Trademark Law, Trademark Law 
and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Dinwoodie & Janis, Eds. 2008); Richard G. Frenkel, 
Intellectual Property in the Balance: Proposals for Improving Industrial Design Protection in the Post-TRIPS Era, 32 Loy. L.A. 
L. Rev. 531 (1999)(proposing expanding copyright to cover industrial designs by elimination of the separability 
test); Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A Legal and Business 
Decision, 84 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 371, 377 (2002). Frijouf, Simultaneous Copyright and Patent Protection, 23 
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 99, 113-14 (1977); Steve W. Ackerman, Protection of the Design of Useful Ar-
ticles: Current Inadequacies and Proposed Solutions, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 1043 (1983); J.H. REICHMAN, Design Pro-
tection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 
1976, 1983 Duke L.J. 1143 (1983);  J.H. Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative 
View of the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. Copr. Soc’y 267, 311 (1983); Anne Theodore Briggs, Hung Out to Dry: 
Clothing Design Protection Pitfalls in United States Law, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J., 169, 173 (2002) 
(“Design patents are a strange compromise between copyright, trademark and patent protections.”); Afori, 
Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 1105 (2008); Gerard N. Magliocca, Ornamental 
Design and Incremental Innovation, 86 Marq. L. Rev. 845 (2003); Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Sug-
gested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 707 (1983); Protecting the Right to Copy: 
Trade Dress Claims for Configurations in Expired Utility Patents Todd R. Geremia, 92 Nw. U.L. Rev. 779 
(1998); The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. Rev. 55 (2007); TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED 
THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1455 (2002); Raphael Winick, Copyright Pro-
tection for Architecture after the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 41 DUKE L.J. 1598, 
619-20 (1992) (overlap between design patents, copyrights and trademarks). See also Lionel M. Lavenue, Intel-
lectual Property for the Protection of Databases, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 24 & n.113 (1997) (software 
may be protectible via patent, copyright and trade secret law); Michael J. Schallop, Protecting User Interfaces: Not as 
Easy as 1-2-3, 45 EMORY L. J. 1533, 1535 (1996) (computer software user interface may be protectible via 
patent, copyright and trademark law). See also Shubha Ghosh, The Morphing of Property Rules and Liability Rules: 
An Intellectual Property Optimist Examines Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 8 FORDHAM I.P., MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 99, 
111 (1997) (overlap exists between copyright and trademark law which can each protect different aspects of 
same product); Moffat, ''Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protec-
tion,'' 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1473 (2004) (noting the “problem” of overlapping intellectual property rights); 
Pogue, Borderland -- Where Copyright and Design Patent Meet, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 33 (Cited by the Supreme Court for 
the proposition that design patent and copyright laws may be overlapping); J.H. Reichman, Past and Current 
Trends in the Evolution of Design Protection Law - A Comment, 4 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 387, 403 
(1993); Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful 
Articles, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 707, 707 (1983); Intellectual Property and the Protection of Industrial Design: Are Sui Generis 
Protection Measures the Answer to Vocal Opponents and a Reluctant Congress?, 13 J. Intell. Prop. L. 255 (2005); Reich-
man, Toward an American Regime of Sui Generis Protection CITE; Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability 
and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles, 37 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 339, 339 (1990); Van Nieuwen-
hoven Helbach, Design Protection and Patent Law, Trademark Law, and the Law of Article 1401 Civil Code, 
in Benelux and Dutch Law, reprinted in Design Protection 5-8, 15-18 (H. Cohen Jehoram, ed. 1976). 
231 Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1174-75 (1999) (describing how 
“the proliferation of intellectual property rights in upstream research may be stifling life-saving innovations 
further downstream in the course of research and product development”); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. 
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offered its reservations regarding overlapping rights.232  In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,233 
for example, the Court wrote in dicta that “when [a] patent expires, the monopoly created by 
it expires, too, and the right to make the article -- including the right to make it in precisely 
the shape it carried when patented -- passes to the public.”234   
This reluctance to allow overlapping rights stems from a commonly held belief “that intel-
lectual property owners should not be permitted to re-categorize one form of intellectual 
property as another, thereby extending the duration of protection beyond that which Con-
gress deemed appropriate for their actual creative efforts.”235  However, when the Court di-
rectly addressed the issue of the effect of a prior patent in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing 
Displays, Inc.,236 it found that a prior utility patent did not categorically bar parallel trade dress 
claims.237  Instead, the prior utility patent served as “strong evidence” that the design fea-
tures were functional – “add[ing] great weight to the statutory presumption that features are 
deemed functional [for trademark purposes] until proved otherwise.”238  Writing in agree-
ment, McCarthy opines that “[a]lthough the Patent Office, in the early years of the Lanham 
Act, held that a configuration covered by a design patent was unregistrable as a trademark, 
this is clearly not the law today.”239 
                                                                                                                                                 
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 700 (1998) 
(emphasizing fragmentation and arguing that it creates an anticommons in IP). 
232 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23 (2003); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel 
Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1938), and Singer Mfg. Co. v. June 
Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). 
233 376 U.S. 225 (1964) 
234 Id.; citing Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120-122 (1938) and Singer Mfg. Co. v. June 
Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896). 
235 Chosun Int'l., Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 328 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2005). 
236 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
237 Id.  
238 Id. (“Where the expired patent claimed the features in question, one who seeks to establish trade dress pro-
tection must carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that 
it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device.”). 
239 McCarthy on Trademarks § 7.91 (2010); citing In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 140 U.S.P.Q. 
575 (C.C.P.A. 1964); Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901, 160 U.S.P.Q. 
413 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012, 177 U.S.P.Q. 205 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In 
re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 181 U.S.P.Q. 821 (C.C.P.A. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080, 42 L. Ed. 2d 
674, 95 S. Ct. 669, 184 U.S.P.Q. 129 (1974). For a historical perspective see William L. Symons, The Law of Pa-
tents for Designs 35 (1914). 
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Although concerns regarding overlapping rights are legitimate, I suggest that the problems 
associated with overlapping design patent rights are unlikely to cause harms or lead to the 
type of dire negative impacts proposed by Heller.  Simply put, the narrow scope of design 
patents and – by definition – their inability to block functionally equivalent work-around 
designs alleviate the downstream multiplier or spillover effects that most concern IPR de-
tractors.240  It is important to recognize Heller and other theorists have not raised any specif-
ic concerns associated with overlapping design patent problems, but rather have focused their 
attention on other forms of intellectual property that tend to have broader scope.241 
More generally, the proactive stance of some courts against overlapping intellectual property 
rights appears misplaced.  Overlapping claims occur in most areas of law.  It is well known 
that a single transaction can result in multiple claims or counts, and the complexity here does 
not appear on any greater scale than a criminal defendant facing multiple charges in multiple 
courts all based on a single action.  In this context, the obsessive nature of some commenta-
tors and courts to “avoid undermining the carefully circumscribed statutory [intellectual 
property] regimes” appears to overshoot their goals.242 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
The focus of this article has been on explaining a justification for our current design patent 
law.  I argue that the best justification today likely falls under trademark theory – seeing de-
sign patent law as creating an alternative rule of evidence for trade dress protection.  Al-
though this ultimate conclusion would depend largely on empirical results, even without 
those results the article is important because of the longstanding conventional wisdom that 
design patents must be justified based upon their associated innovation incentive.  The ar-
ticle also recognizes that a well crafted trade dress law can still leave room for a separate 
form of protection that uses orthogonal limits to fill-in gaps of protection.  
The recognition of shared goals between design patent and trademark laws has many policy 
implications.  From a process standpoint the interrelation of goals suggests potential benefits 
                                                 
240 The additional requirement of newness and the limited term of enforceability likewise limit the potential 
harm. See Part III.A, supra.  
241 See articles cited in Note 231, supra. 
242 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Comp. 16 cmt. b (1993) 
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from easing our current strict personnel separations. Notably, (1) a company’s trademark 
counsel is typically not allowed to prosecute design patents unless that individual is also a 
patent attorney; (2) within the Patent & Trademark Office, design patent examiners are en-
tirely separated from those handling trade dress registrations; and (3) appeals of trade dress 
cases are handled by the regional circuits while design patent cases are appealed to the Fed-
eral Circuit.  Integrating these now separate institutions has the potential of aiding the un-
derstanding and development of the scope and limits of the complementary rights.243 
If design patents are to remain an important first-step in protecting rights, the US should 
consider switching from a de facto design patent registration system to one that is de jure.  This 
change could further increase the speed and reduce the cost of design patent issuance. Per-
haps more importantly, the change may help restore dignity to the utility patent examination 
process.  If examination is eliminated for design patents, the typical strong presumption of 
validity associated with patent rights may be adjusted downward.244  
Finally, many discussions of industrial design rights begin and end with the suggestion of a 
sui generis regime of protection.  I am convinced that many (but certainly not all) of those 
commentators have not fully considered the current design patent prosecution process and 
its potential uses.  Apart from the political difficulty in making such a change, I suggest that 
an incremental move toward registration of design patent rights is a more prudent approach.  
Design patent law is known and fairly well settled.  Over the years there have been few over-
propertization concerns with design patent rights and there are real concerns that any new 
regime could be over-broad.  Of course, this policy suggestion loses weight if a sui generis law 
is constructed with the purpose of promoting design innovation – the oft-stated but unmet 
goal of today’s design patent regime.  
                                                 
243 For instance, acquired trademark distinctiveness could conceivably be asserted as a secondary indicia sup-
porting nonobviousness – an idea that has long been rejected doctrinally. Rowe v. Blodgett & Clapp Co., 112 F. 61 
(2nd Cir. 1901)(rejecting the patentee’s attempt to “justify the issuance” of the design patent on a trademark 
theory). 
244 See Douglas Lichtman and Mark Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 Stanford Law 
Review 45 (2007). 
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VI.APPENDIX I 
List of Recent Cases Where an Accused Product was Accused of both Design Patent and Trade 
Dress Infringement 
A. Court decisions involving combined accusations of design patent and trade dress 
infringement. 
• Levenger Co. v. Feldman, 516 F.Supp.2d 1272 (S.D.Fla. 2007) (stitching around binder). 
• Adventure Products, Inc. v. Simply Smashing, Inc., 2007 WL 2775128 (S.D. Cal. 2007) 
(compressed t-shirt shapes). 
• Genender Intern., Inc. v. Skagen Designs, Ltd., 2008 WL 2521894 (N.D.Ill. 2008) 
(watch). 
• Hammerton, Inc. v. Heisterman, 2008 WL 2004327 (D.Utah 2008) (light fixture). 
• American Custom Golf Cars, Inc. v. Ecoblue Corp., 2006 WL 4704619 (C.D. Cal. 
2006)(golf cart design). 
• Global Mfg. Group, LLC v. Gadget Universe.Com, 417 F.Supp.2d 1161 (S.D. Cal. 2006) 
(electric scooter). 
• Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd. v. Pac. Bay Int'l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 683 (6th Cir. 2006). 
• Keystone Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Jaccard Corp., 2007 WL 655758 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (meat ten-
derizer). 
• In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (clothing design). 
• Hartco Engineering, Inc. v. Wang's Intern., Inc., 142 Fed.Appx. 455 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(hitch cover). 
• Decorations for Generations, Inc. v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 128 Fed.Appx. 133 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (Christmas tree stand). 
• Bionix Development Corp. v. Sklar Corp., 2009 WL 3353154 (E.D.Pa. 2009) (ear cu-
rettes). 
• Professional Product Research Inc. v. General Star Indem. Co., 623 F.Supp.2d 438 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
• E-Z Bowz, L.L.C. v. Professional Product Research Co., Inc., 2005 WL 535065 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (bow-making apparatus). 
B. Recent complaints filed involving combined accusations of design patent and 
trade dress infringement. 
• 180S, Inc. Et Al V Gordini U.S.A., Inc., Case No: 1:08-cv-00177-JFM, (U.S. District 
Court for the District of Maryland (MDD), Filed 01/22/2008)(ear warmer). 
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• Ameribag, Inc. Et Al v. Mascorro Leather, Inc., Case No: 1:09-cv-08917-JFK, (S.D.N.Y. 
Filed 10/21/2009)(leather shoulder bag). 
• Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. Et Al v. Islamic Republic Of Iran Et Al, Case No: 1:06-cv-
01694-RMU, (D.D.C., Filed 9/29/2006)( helicopter). 
• Cartier Et Al v. Geneve Collections, Inc. Et Al, Case No: 1:07-cv-00201-DLI-MDG, 
(U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (NYED), Filed 
01/16/2007)(tank watch face). 
• Columbia Insurance Company Et Al v. National Fashions Imports, Inc., Case No: 1:05-
cv-10191-RCC, (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (NYSD), 
Filed 12/05/2005)(shoes). 
• David Sutherland, Inc v. Teak Only, LLC, Case No: 3:06-cv-02265-D , (U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas (TXND), Filed 12/08/2006)(pool chair furni-
ture). 
• Extreme Cctv, Inc. Et Al v. Say Security Group Usa, Case No: 4:07-cv-04819-CW, (U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California (CAND), Filed 
09/19/2007)(mounting for a camera). 
• Hubbell Incorporated Et Al v. Sun Valley Lighting Standards, Inc., Case No: 2:08-cv-
04651-PSG-FFM, (U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (CACD), 
Filed 07/16/2008)(light fixture design). 
• In Zone, Inc. v. Das Distributors Et Al, Case No: 2:08-cv-00376-TJW-CE, (U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Texas (TXED), Filed 10/03/2008)(travel mug). 
• Monster Cable Products, Inc. v. Timex Corporation, Case No: 2:08-cv-00238-TJW, (U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (TXED), Filed 06/11/2008)(packaging 
for cables). 
• Parfums Nina Ricci v. National Entertainment Collectibles Association, Inc. Et Al, Case 
No: 2:09-cv-01177-DMC-MF, (U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey (NJD), 
Filed 03/16/2009)(red apple perfume bottle). 
• Phoenix International Inc v. Robinson Technical Southeast Inc, Case No: 2:08-cv-
00709-PJG, (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin (WIED), Filed 
08/19/2008)(industrial oven). 
• Simply Orange Juice Company Et Al v. Resilux America, Llc Et Al, Case No: 1:08-cv-
02333-JEC, (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (GAND), Filed 
07/18/2008)(Simply Orange juice bottle). 
• Sterilite Corporation v. Centrex Plastics, Inc., Case No: 1:07-cv-11827-RCL, (U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts (MAD), Filed 09/27/2007)(hinged lid sto-
rage box). 
• Umbra, Inc. v. Elsa L, Inc., 03-cv-1921 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (asserting both design patent 
and trade dress rights in a picture frame) (case settled after 310 days). 
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• David Sutherland Inc v. J Alexander Collection Inc, Case No: 3:05-cv-01103, (N.D. Tex. 
2005) (asserting design patent, trade dress, and copyright infringement in furniture de-
sign) (case settled after 143 days). 
• BLUMBERG INDUSTRIES, INC., d/b/a Fine Art Lamps, v. THE JOHN RICHARD, 
2008 WL 4403290 (asserting both design patent trade dress and copyright infringement). 
• Monster Cable Products, Inc. v. Accell Corp., No. 2008 CV 00230 (E.D. Tex. 2008), 
2008 WL 2772464 (asserting both design patent and trade dress infringement). 
• GENENDER v. SKAGEN, No. 07 C 5993, (N.D. Ill., 2008)(declaratory judgment 
complaint alleging non-infringement and invalidity of design patent and trade dress). 
• BELK v. MEYER CORP., 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 481090 (declaratory judgment 
complaint alleging non-infringement and invalidity of design patents and trade dress). 
The Procter & Gamble Co., v. Blue Cross Labs., 2008 WL 2515631 (S.D. Ohio 
2008)(asserting both design patent and unregistered trade dress rights in a shampoo bot-
tle shape). 
• Mobile Hi-Tech Wheels v. Custom Wheels Unlimited, Inc., 2008 WL 2127507 (C.D. 
Cal. 2008)(asserting both design patent and unregistered trade dress rights in a vehicle 
wheel design). 
• Nike, Inc. v. Not for Noth'n LLC, 2008 WL 2127671 (C.D. Cal. 2008)(asserting both 
design patent and unregistered trade dress rights in Nike's Air Jordon shoes). 
• Kai USA Ltd. v. Master Cutlery Inc, Case No: 3:01-cv-00616-JE (D. Ore. 2001) (Kai as-
serted both design patent and trade dress infringement). 
• Maxima Technologies & Systems, LLC v. Auto Meter Products, Inc., Case No: 2:05-cv-
05392-JKG (E.D. Pa. 2005) (alleging both trade dress and design patent infringement for 
a speedometer). 
• Sketchers U.S.A., Inc., v. Renaissance Imports, Inc., 07-cv-07341 (C.D.Cal. 2007). 
• Columbia Ins. Co., v. Wanted Shoes, Inc., Case No: 3:05-cv-00583-JBA (D. Conn. 
2005)(asserting design patent and unregistered trade dress infringement) (settled after 90 
days). 
• Unique Functional Products, Inc. v. Mastercraft Boat Co., Inc., 82 Fed. Appx. 683 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (vacating preliminary injunction on design patent claim plaintiff had alleged 
both design patent and trade dress claims). 
• Talking Rain Beverage Co. Inc. v. South Beach Beverage Co.. 349 F.3d 601 (9th Cir. 
2003) (affirming lower court’s finding that trade dress was invalid as functional parties 
settled design patent claim out of court). 
• Hammerton, Inc. v. Heisterman, 2008 WL 2004327 (D.Utah, 2008) (holding that genera-
lized claims of knocking off are not cognizable). 
• Cartier v. D & D Jewelry Imports, 510 F.Supp.2d 344 (S.D.N.Y., 2007). 
